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Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the United Nations’ implementation of Resolution 1325 in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations.  Seven criteria were derived from the Secretary General’s Reports on 
Women, Peace, and Security: Peacekeeping Operations; Post-conflict Reconstruction; 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration;  Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based 
Violence; Gender Balance; Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence by UN 
Personnel; and Monitoring and Reporting.  These criteria were applied to four case studies:  the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).  Each case study 
provides a description of the activities conducted and an evaluation for each criterion.  The paper 
makes conclusions about the effects of specific characteristics of some of the cases and about 
areas in which the UN needs broader solutions.  Specifically, suggestions are made for improved 
UN efforts in Gender Balance, Responding to Gender-Based Violence by UN Personnel, and 
Monitoring and Reporting. 
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PREFACE 
 I would like to begin by acknowledging the support of my advisor, Don Goldstein.  He 
has been a valuable consultant and advocate of my work, despite many differing opinions.  It has 
been a pleasure to work with him.  Additionally, this work would not have been possible without 
my loving family and friends who have supported me, encouraged me, and occasionally 
chastised me during my work on this paper. 
 
 A few notes on my sources and citations.  The footnote numbers correspond first to the 
number of the work in my Works Cited and the second number to the page of the work.  For 
example, 4-72 corresponds to the 72nd page of the fourth work in my Works Cited list.  
Following the Works Cited is a bibliography of all UN documents and sources which I examined 
in researching this paper.  While not cited directly, all have been used in generalizations about 
UN reports, mission activities, and in formulating my conclusions. 
 
Finally, I will discuss some assumptions and limitations of this paper.  First, a few 
cautions about my semantics.  I use the terms sex, gender, woman and female somewhat fluidly 
because most primary source U.N. documentation does not make distinctions in its use of these 
terms.  For those who insist on clarification, it is fair to assume that these documents use 
essentialized assumptions that female is synonymous with woman or a feminine social position.  
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Considering the countries examined in this paper, this assumption is safe for a vast majority of 
the population.  Although this is still not ideal for an academic paper that encompasses gender 
studies, there is not a clear alternative.  For those who still wish to criticize my terminology, I 
will suggest that prior to progressive understandings of gender in post-conflict nations, it is 
necessary to have basic peace, stability, and development, especially for women.  Thus, while it 
is possible that my analyses are incomplete because they overlook other categories of the 
population “gendered women” (children, the disabled, minority religious or ethnic groups, etc), 
this does not make the analyses or conclusions irrelevant. 
Another term I use occasionally is “victim” – “victims” of violence, “victims” of rape, or 
“victims” or sexual abuse.  To preemptively clarify, my use of the term is not meant to classify 
“victims” into any limiting categories.  While victim is a role that describes many of the women 
in situations I am analyzing, by using it I in no way mean to suggest that this is all they are or all 
that they can be.  Women who were victims still have great potential for empowerment to 
overcome their past experiences. 
Next, some cautions about my methodology.  My evaluation criteria are a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative assessments to measure if and how certain peacekeeping operations 
have achieved each of seven criteria.  The only criterion that requires quantitative data is that of 
gender balance.  However, I have provided quantitative data in other categories – such as the 
number of allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) made against UN personnel, or 
the number of women who participate in elections – in order to elucidate on particular points.  In 
including these numbers, I am not using a formula such as “when the number of rapes in a 
country exponentially approaches zero” to calculate success or failure.  Instead, the numbers are 
meant to indicate progress or lack thereof for particular programs. 
 x 
Another potential critique of this work is that the UN is not an appropriate or ideal 
institution to conduct peacekeeping.  While the UN has received its share of criticism, it is 
certain to continue peacekeeping operations in the future.  Thus, whether the UN is the best 
institution to conduct peacekeeping operations or not, is not at issue here.  Instead, research 
which assesses UN operations and isolates successes and failures is important because whether 
the UN is an ideal agent of international intervention or not, it does have the potential to learn 
and improve. 
Finally, I will comment briefly on two potential limitations of this paper.  First, while I 
am attempting to isolate and analyze the peacekeeping missions in each of four countries, they 
cannot truly be examined in a vacuum.  With the increasing multidimensionality of peace 
operations and their coordination with various other UN agencies, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), and national and local governments, it is nearly impossible to attribute 
certain programs and their success or failure exclusively to the peacekeeping operation.  When 
possible, I have attempted to indicate agencies or NGOs partnering with a peacekeeping mission.  
However, peacekeeping missions are complex webs of programs and institutions and the strings 
are not always transparent.  Thus, discretion as to what constitutes a peacekeeping operation and 
what does not may limit some of my conclusions. 
A second limitation is that all of the peacekeeping missions in this paper are ongoing at 
the time of writing.  All of these missions will eventually end either because they have fulfilled 
their mandates, there is no longer domestic or international support for them, or the country has 
returned to violence.  However, unlike other analyses of peacekeeping missions’ success, my 
analysis is not based on the accomplishment of a mission’s mandate.  Instead, my analysis is of 
process, daily operations, and ongoing program decisions as opposed to a holistic assessment of 
 xi 
 xii 
the mission and its end.  Undoubtedly, future studies will be able to analyze post-1325 missions 
with a fuller picture of the pace of UN reform and its results.  However, this paper is unique 
because it is able to look at the operations of missions during and immediately following 
Resolution 1325. 
 
 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
On October 31, 2000, a silent revolution took place in the small chamber of the United 
Nations Security Council.  After years of lobbying by governments, women’s organizations, 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and countless hardworking individuals, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1325.  This document was the first time that the Security Council 
acknowledged the unique needs of women in conflict, peace, and security, the roles that women 
play in these situations, and the responsibility of the international community to work towards 
equality. 
Unfortunately, in the months and years that followed Resolution 1325, the document was 
not placed on a pedestal, nor did it create major reforms of the inner-workings of the Security 
Council, the UN, or the nations who assented to the Resolution.  While the Security Council’s 
Resolution was monumental, it was merely words lacking commitment and political will.  In 
subsequent years, the Security Council and United Nations system have barely begun to 
understand what their declaration requires.  While Resolution 1325 has made waves throughout 
the UN system, particularly in agencies like United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), this author is 
interested in the effects it has had in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and 
within peacekeeping missions in the field. 
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While the UN’s gender revolution happened, the DPKO was simultaneously undergoing 
changes of its own.  Previously, in the early 1990’s, the DPKO had experienced major 
expansions, followed by setbacks and recognition of limits to peace missions in the later part of 
the decade.  Recently, the DPKO has begun viewing its operations in a new light – known as 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping.  Multi-dimensional missions expand on the old methods of 
military monitoring and observing to include a holistic perspective of human rights and 
development as part of peacekeeping and peacemaking.  Multi-dimensional missions include 
tasks such as humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, disarmament programs, the rebuilding 
of national institutions, support and training for local police, the rebuilding of justice systems, 
and support for democratic elections.  Additionally, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions’ 
mandates generally allow for a greater use of force, providing peacekeepers with more options to 
effectively maintain a secure environment and protect human rights. 
The interaction of the changes within the Department of Peacekeeping and those caused 
by Resolution 1325 undoubtedly led to both some steps forward and some backward for women 
employed by the UN and women affected by UN peacekeeping missions.  The rest of this 
chapter will do several things.  First, it will provide background that explains Resolution 1325 
and analyzes its development in UN documents through the year 2005.  Second, it will explain 
the criteria that the UN developed for measuring the implementation of Resolution 1325 in 
peacekeeping operations.  Third, there will be an overview of the case studies contained in this 
paper and an explanation of how they were selected.  Specifically, the case studies evaluated in 
this paper are: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), The United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).  
 2 
Each case study has been evaluated in seven areas, all of which are explained in the following 
section, 1.1 Background and Methodology.  This author’s conclusions may be found in the final 
section of each case study chapter along with some summary conclusions in Chapter 6. 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
Resolution 1325’s most significant contribution to the UN system was to establish the 
policy of gender mainstreaming.  The UN defines “gender mainstreaming” as follows: “the 
process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including 
legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making 
women’s, as well as men’s, concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic 
and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.”1  
After creating this important progressive concept, Resolution 1325 goes on to use language 
merely “recommending” that UN departments and member nations implement gender 
mainstreaming.  While this weak language has led to slow or even non-existent implementation, 
Resolution 1325 is important because it contains essential definitions used by at least some UN 
agencies to make strides toward equality. 
To more fully understand the significance of Resolution 1325, it is important to 
understand the development of UN policy on women’s rights and gender equality.  There are two 
major precursors to the DPKO’s implementation of Resolution 1325.  The first is the 1995 
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Beijing Declaration, produced at the Fourth World Conference on Women, which provides an 
international action plan on women’s rights and equality.  The Conference was attended by over 
1700 representatives from 189 countries and territories, the United Nations and various NGOs.  
The Conference was the largest ever held by the UN and the Declaration is cited as the beginning 
of a new international feminist movement.  The Declaration included seventeen points of action 
to eliminate discrimination against women, promote economic independence and sustainable 
development, ensure women’s access to healthcare and education, and work towards peace and 
respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.  This broad Declaration was meant 
to apply to all governments and UN agencies. 
The second precursor to Resolution 1325 that needs mentioning came from within the 
DPKO.  In May of 2000, just four months prior to Resolution 1325, the DPKO’s Lessons 
Learned Unit held a seminar on the topic of “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in 
Multidimensional Peace Support Operations” in Windhoek, Namibia.  This location gave the 
Windhoek Declaration and accompanying Namibia Plan of Action their names.  The Namibia 
Plan of Action, the more detailed of the two documents, discusses nine areas of the peacekeeping 
process in which gender mainstreaming is needed and provides some guidance on how to 
accomplish this mainstreaming. 
 From the content of the recommendations, it was clear that the Namibia Plan of Action 
was closely aligned with the goals of Resolution 1325, passed in October of 2000.  Unfortunately 
however, because of the previously mentioned vague and abstract language of Resolution 1325, 
the document did not engrave the Namibia Plan of into the UN system.  Instead, it created the 
need for additional clarification.  To the further frustration of women and women’s advocates, 
these clarifications did not come quickly and were often packaged with additional vague 
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commitments.  For example, each year around the anniversary of Resolution 1325 the President 
of the Security Council makes a statement reaffirming the Security Council’s commitment to the 
Resolution’s implementation.  While these statements are positive, they are a ruse; their words 
fail to add weight to Resolution 1325. 
Fortunately, there is one document series that did begin to really analyze Resolution 
1325’s implementation.  A semi-annual series of Reports of the Secretary General on Women 
Peace and Security began in 2002.  The first report outlined the ways that women were affected 
by war, conflict, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction, but did not discuss how the UN 
was reacting to these effects.  Thus, it was not until the second Report of the Secretary General 
on Women, Peace, and Security in October of 2004 that the UN specified how Resolution 1325 
had been and should be implemented in peacekeeping operations.  Unlike its weak and 
incomprehensive predecessors, the second report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace, 
and Security finally developed a system by which the UN and others could evaluate 
peacekeeping operations.  The report classifies peacekeeping missions into eleven areas of 
operation:  
1. Conflict Prevention and Early-warning,  
2. Peace Process and Negotiations,  
3. Peacekeeping Operations,  
4. Humanitarian Response,  
5. Post-Conflict Reconstruction,  
6. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, 
7. Preventing and Responding to Gender Based Violence in Armed Conflict,  
8. Gender Balance in Recruitment,  
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9. Preventing and Responding to Sexual Violence by UN Personnel, 
10. Coordination, and 
11. Monitoring and Reporting. 
Slight variations on these eleven areas are used in the three subsequent Reports on 
Women, Peace, and Security in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  This author has selected some of these 
criteria as well to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations.  Because all 11 criteria do not apply to 
the DPKO and peacekeeping missions in the field, only seven of these criteria will be used.  
Below these seven criteria are explained based on the way the Secretary General analyzes each 
in the second and subsequent Women, Peace, and Security reports: 
1. Peacekeeping Operations – While this criterion may seem repetitive, it refers to the 
operational aspects of the peacekeeping mission and the work of the senior gender advisor and 
her or his gender unit.  Large initiatives that demonstrate the integration of mainstreaming at 
leadership levels or systematically throughout the mission fall into this criterion.  The work of 
the gender advisor and unit may include: studies, gender analyses of policies and programs, 
advice and assistance to other units of the mission, development or provision of training, 
convening workshops for information sharing, working with local women’s organizations, or 
running public information campaigns. 
2. Post-conflict Reconstruction – This is the largest criterion in terms of the number of 
different programs this criterion encompasses.  These activities include the development of 
women’s leadership capacity and their inclusion in Truth and Reconciliation Committees, the 
electoral process, the transitional government, and a new or more permanent government at both 
national and local levels.  Another big component of post-conflict reconstruction is the 
rebuilding of national police forces, their recruitment of female officers, and providing gender 
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sensitivity training for new police officers.  Other justice system reforms under this criterion are 
efforts to facilitate prosecutions of human rights violators, especially those who have committed 
acts of violence against women, legal changes that promote women’s equality, and increases in 
women’s participation in the justice system.  Finally, development projects targeting women, 
specifically Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) funded through the DPKO fall into this criterion. 
3. Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) – Conducting thorough DDR 
programs that acknowledge the role of women as armed combatants or as individuals associated 
with fighting forces is essential to a mainstreamed DDR program.  Recognizing the need for 
gender sensitivity in planning and training is one way to accomplish this.  Gender sensitivity may 
include having separate facilities and female personnel to process female participants in the DDR 
program or including provisions for dependents of participants of the DDR program. 
4. Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence (GBV) – One of the most 
horrific experiences of women in armed conflict is that of gender-based violence – from rape and 
sexual assault to sexual slavery or human trafficking.  Because this is a way in which women are 
often uniquely affected by war and conflict (not to disregard the sexual violence or torture 
committed against men and boys), this criterion is frequently focused on for efforts to address the 
needs of women.  Some of these efforts include providing training for peacekeeping personnel 
and local police forces to effectively investigate and elicit reports of GBV.  Additionally, to 
ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted, peacekeeping missions promote legal reforms and 
provide training to special investigators, prosecutors, and judges.  All steps of enforcing national 
and international law on perpetrators of GBV and attempts to reduce overall instances of GBV 
are a part of this criterion.  Finally, medical, legal, and psychological services for women who 
have experienced these crimes also count toward this criterion. 
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5. Gender Balance in Recruitment – Peacekeeping operations frequently lack women in 
all aspects of the missions – military units, civilian police personnel, and international and local 
civilian employees.  This criterion is almost exclusively quantitative, although such quantitative 
records of gender disaggregated data are sparse and difficult to find.  A smaller part of this 
criterion is the number of (universally so low as to be better phrased “the existence of”) women 
in high level leadership positions in the peace missions. 
6. Responding to GBV by Peacekeepers and UN personnel – The United Nations has a 
zero-tolerance policy for acts of rape, GBV, or Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) committed 
by UN personnel.  Even consensual sex between peacekeepers and the local population is 
strongly discouraged because of the imbalance of power between peacekeepers and the local 
population.  Furthermore, the necessity of peacekeepers remaining neutral make even consensual 
relations suspect.2  When these incidents do happen, they affect not only the individual abused 
but the legitimacy of the entire mission and all United Nations peacekeeping missions.  In order 
to deal with and prevent instances of GBV by UN personnel, the missions’ activities are similar 
to and sometimes merged with methods and programs discussed in #4.  UN personnel receive 
initial training on the zero-tolerance policy and occasionally update training, as well.  
Allegations of SEA are investigated by some combination of a Conduct and Discipline Unit and 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services.  Furthermore, when SEA by UN personnel becomes a 
systemic problem, missions may implement additional prevention measures which are also a part 
of this criterion. 
7. Monitoring and Reporting – The final criterion is the degree to which the Security 
Council is kept informed of the progress of gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations.  
                                                 
2 64-2 
 8 
Through regular reports, end-of-mission evaluations, and the reports of the Best Practices Office, 
the inclusion of statistics, descriptions of programs for women, and mainstreaming successes and 
failures determine whether peacekeeping missions successfully accomplish this criteria. 
Of the many possible aspects of each of the criteria listed above, no peacekeeping 
mission has done all of them.  However, what will be considered in evaluating these cases is the 
actions each mission has taken in comparison with the scope of the problem being targeted and 
the success or failure of programs to achieve progress for women.  Based on this general sense, 
each mission will receive an evaluation of adequate efforts, inadequate efforts, or no efforts on 
each of the criteria. 
1.2 CASE STUDY SELECTION 
There have been twenty-two peacekeeping missions that the United Nations has 
participated in since the passage of Resolution 1325 in October of 2000.  Some of these missions 
began before this date and thus adopted mainstreaming efforts mid-way through the mission 
while others that began after this date had mainstreaming efforts integrated into the mission’s 
initial planning.  As it would not be practical to examine all twenty-two missions, three main 
criteria helped to narrowing the list: 
1) Temporal significance – Only cases that have operated primarily post-Resolution 1325 
will be analyzed.  MONUC, UNMIL, MINUSTAH, and UNMIT began in 2000, 2003, 2004, and 
2006, respectively.  This time span provides me with data throughout the last eight years and 
should illuminate whether the UN has changed and improved at implementing mainstreaming 
over time.  Although MONUC is the only mission which began before Resolution 1325 (seven 
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months prior), this difference should not be a factor in examining MONUC’s operations after 
October of 2000. 
2) Geographically representative – Gender inequity is a global problem for developed and 
lesser developed nations, Western, Eastern, European, Asian, African, Caribbean, and Latin 
American.  By choosing operations in three different global regions – Africa, East Asia, and the 
Caribbean – it will be clear that that problems implementing mainstreaming are not constrained 
to any one continent and that different strategies are successful when peacekeepers recognize and 
respect national and cultural differences.  Unfortunately, these differences also mean that a 
successful mainstreaming practice cannot and should not be immediately applied to every 
operation.  Instead, the process of developing successful practices is what must be learned and 
shared. 
3) Organizationally similar – Not all peacekeeping operations have full time gender 
advisors or gender units.  Of the eighteen current UN peacekeeping missions, twelve have full-
time gender advisors and six have gender focal points.  However, operations with full time 
gender advisors show a basic commitment to the goals of mainstreaming and allow for an 
institutional mechanism to promote mainstreaming.  Additionally, this criterion also filtered for 
missions that operate in the new style of multidimensional operations. 
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2.0  UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) 
The United Nations Mission in Liberia represents several firsts and significant 
accomplishments for mainstreaming in peacekeeping missions.  From having the first all-female 
police unit to the only female Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in a 
peacekeeping mission, Liberia is often cited as evidence of gender mainstreaming’s advancement 
in the department.  However, even with these achievements, UNMIL still could use improvement 
in some areas.  Before getting into this analysis, the following two subsections provide an 
abbreviated background of Liberia’s conflict history and the situation of women in the country.  
After creating this setting, the rest of the chapter will discuss UNMIL’s activities related to the 
seven criteria and evaluate UNMIL’s efforts on each criterion. 
 
History3 
Liberia has experienced civil war on and off since 1989.  In 1993, the Economic 
Coalition of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered a peace deal among the warring factions 
and a UN peacekeeping mission monitored the implementation of a peace deal and the election 
of former rebel leader Charles Taylor as president.  While political parties struggled to bring 
about a stable government, the country had several years of relative peace.  Civil war broke out 
again in July of 2003 among government forces and rebel factions.  Once again ECOWAS 
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helped broker a peace deal in August of 2003.  This peace deal requested a second UN 
peacekeeping mission.  Thus, Resolution 1509 created UNMIL in September of 2003.  UNMIL’s 
original mandate was to do five main tasks: 1) support the ceasefire agreement and assist in 
implementing a Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRR) 
program; 2) protect UN staff, facilities, and civilians; 3) support humanitarian assistance and 
protect human rights (including “vulnerable groups” like women and children); 4) support 
security sector reform, including monitoring and restructuring Liberia’s National Police Force 
(LNP) and military forces; and 5) assist the transitional government to restructure the 
administrative and government system, rebuild a national legal system and judicial and 
correctional facilities, and prepare for national elections to be held no later than 2005. 
 
Women in Liberia 
The problems facing women in Liberia prior to UNMIL were not that different than their 
post-conflict problems – low levels of education, lack of healthcare, and poverty.  According to a 
2000 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) publication, 47% of female heads of 
household had no formal education and 18.7% received only primary education.4  In healthcare, 
the government made very few attempts to address serious problems facing women such as 
HIV/AIDS, the inaccessibility of condoms, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), rape, or high 
maternal mortality (578 per 100,000 live births).5  During relative peace between 2000 and 2003, 
the Liberian government was working on a plan for poverty reduction which included a gender 
component.  However, this plan ended abruptly when conflict again broke out in Liberia.6  Only 
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two parts of the plan were accomplished – 1) trainings on gender equality for legislators, 
policymakers, and members of the judiciary and 2) the passage of a land law which allowed 
women to inherit land from their husbands and fathers.7 
Another step the Liberian government took towards promoting women’s equality was the 
creation of the Ministry on Gender and Development in 2001.  The Ministry’s broad mission 
incorporated aspects of gender mainstreaming in national policy and solidified international 
declarations on women’s rights.  For example, the Ministry helped promote the ratification and 
passage into law of the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).8  However, the Ministry’s activities were constrained by the ongoing 
violence throughout the country. 
2.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Description 
From the initial organization of UNMIL, a senior gender advisor position and a gender 
unit were created.  Joana Foster filled the senior gender advisor position for several years; 
however, the position has been vacant since 2008.9  Regardless, the related gender unit is very 
active and the results of their work are visible in the DDR program, Liberia’s elections, and 
campaigns against rape, GBV, and SEA.  While these programs are analyzed in the relevant 
sections below, the use of the gender unit’s expertise in many areas demonstrates that the 
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operation has a culture which supports the use of mainstreaming.  The gender unit is looked to as 
a source of support and advice and has support from others throughout the mission. 
In addition to a progressive institutional culture, the gender unit has also made 
independent accomplishments.  Their most significant contribution to the mission has been 
training programs for UNMIL personnel, government officials, NGOs, women’s and civil 
society organizations, the Liberian National Police, the Liberian military, and Liberian justice 
system.  UNMIL personnel, including civilian staff, civilian police, and military personnel, were 
trained on mainstreaming methods and conduct and discipline issues like SEA.  Trainings 
throughout 2005 and 2006 broke down as shown in Figure 2-1.  Note that the last line of Figure 
2-1 refers to a train-the-trainer program in which the gender unit trained CIVPOL who in turn 
train other CIVPOL and LNP officers on gender during induction training. 
Figure 2-1: Trainees of the UNMIL Office of Gender Affairs, Jan. 2005-Jun. 2006 
Personnel Type Total # of women % women 
UNMIL national staff 301 84 38% 
UNMIL international 
staff and CIVPOL 
521 162 31% 
CIVPOL trainers 26 12 46% 
*Figures from the Office of Gender Affairs Achievements 2004-2006 Report 
 
If the pace of trainings continued in the trend shown in Figure 2-1, then UNMIL is disseminating 
information very effectively.  However, more recent data to either support or contradict this 
possibility is not available.  If these “routine” trainings ended in mid-2006, then UNMIL has 
failed thousands of other employees who may not have the knowledge and skills to mainstream 
gender in their daily work. 
Other independent accomplishments of the gender unit are work with groups in the 
Liberian government and civil society.  The gender unit helped the national government to 
develop a structure for gender issues similar to the UN’s structure.  Working with the Ministry of 
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Gender and Development, the gender unit established county gender coordinators in 14 out of 
Liberia’s 15 counties and gender desk officers in all of Liberia’s government ministries.10  
UNMIL’s gender unit also works with local women’s organizations on projects ranging from 
women’s involvement in the peace process to an action plan on sexual and gender based 
violence. 
 
Evaluation 
 Ultimately, while the gender unit has not had any major failures, it also has not had major 
achievements.  The unit functions as an integral part of the mission and its expertise is used by 
various other mission components.  The unit has run trainings and worked with organizations 
outside of UNMIL to implement mainstreaming.  Thus, on this criterion UNMIL has made just 
adequate efforts towards mainstreaming.  
2.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTURCTION 
Description 
UNMIL conducted several reconstruction efforts in Liberia: supporting the elections, 
rebuilding the government and its administrative structure, forming the Liberian National Police 
and Liberian Armed Forces, rebuilding the legal and justice system, and development projects 
like roads, education facilities, healthcare facilities, and more.  All of these projects 
mainstreamed gender with varying degrees of success.  One of UNMIL’s greatest successes was 
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the 2005 elections.  Women were represented in the election planning phase, as electoral staff as 
voters, and a few women became elected officials.  In preparation for the elections, UNMIL 
lobbied the government during the drafting of the compromise bill on elections.  However, this 
bill ultimately eliminated language about specific outreach to women.11   
UNMIL also worked with the National Electoral Committee (NEC) which was made of 
seven individuals, three of whom were women.12  UNMIL ensured that voter handbooks and 
training manuals for members of the elections commission contained a gender perspective.13  
Through these awareness measures and voter education programs, women registered to vote in 
numbers just exceeding registered men; 50% plus 50 additional women registered.14  UNMIL 
promoted women’s involvement as polling staff, election observers, and candidates.15  An 
electoral guideline of the NEC stated that each party must have 30% of their nominees be 
women.16  Unfortunately, only one party met this threshold and the total percent of all women 
candidates was only 14%.  In order to prepare female candidates for the election, UNMIL 
supported a workshop that included sessions on campaign planning, public speaking, public 
relations, working with the media, and the art of winning.17 
The elections results did end in victory for 13 women legislators who make up 17% of 
the Senate and 14% of the House.  To boost the impact of these women, UNMIL ran workshops 
following the election for female-elected officials.18  A second significant victory for women in 
the elections was Liberia’s new president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.  This election made Liberia the 
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first African nation to have a democratically elected female head of state.  Of Johnson-Sirleaf’s 
cabinet members, 31% are women.   
Another aspect of reconstruction UNMIL worked on was improvements to the justice 
system.  UNMIL worked on a penal reform development plan, part of which involved the issue 
of separate prison facilities for women and juveniles.19  While a requirement to this effect was on 
the books, a lack of infrastructure prevented this reality.  One of UNMIL’s QIPs addressed this 
issue in Monrovia Central Prison by renovating the bathrooms, toilets, and water system for both 
male and female blocks.20  Progress beyond this one facility, however, has not been reported.  To 
help relieve the burden on the prison system and bring justice to Liberian women, UNMIL, 
UNDP, and the Ministry of Justice hired five prosecutors to process exclusively gender-based 
violence and rape cases.21 
As to the rebuilding of the Liberian National Police, UNMIL is supporting recruitment 
and training for police and specific programs for women.  The LNP has a female police chief and 
a small number of female officers.  In 2007, women made up 10% of the force with 361 women 
out of 3610 total officers.22  Because significant barriers prevent women from choosing a career 
as a police officer, UNMIL developed an education program to provide remedial high school 
education for women.23  Once women in the program pass the high school examination, they can 
enter directly into the police academy.  Beyond increasing the number of women in the LNP, 
further indication of the LNP’s success is indicated by a June 2008 document on the increased 
reporting of crimes to the LNP.  According to the UN Deputy Envoy for Rule of Law:   
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“[Increased reporting] reflects the increased confidence and trust for reporting 
such crimes rather than being indicative of an increase in the actual 
crimes…Women are coming forward, and they are speaking out – this is 
especially significant when one examines the number of cases in which family 
and close friends are actually involved in the crimes."24 
A final program LNP program developed by the UNMIL gender unit was a national Women’s 
and Children’s Unit to address issues of violence against these segments of the population.25 
In terms of infrastructure and development projects, UNMIL funded several programs 
through its QIP fund.  One project funded the construction of a county office building for the 
Ministry of Gender and Development.26 Another project built a Women’s and Children’s Shelter 
just outside of the capitol which WomenAid, a local NGO, now runs.  The facility also provides 
skills training, adult literacy and learning, and temporary shelter for abused women and 
children.27  Other ad hoc development projects include a program to promote economic 
opportunities for women in agriculture and business, a teacher training program for 600 primary 
school teachers (53% of whom were women), and a free medical clinic established by the 
Pakistani contingent of UNMIL (including female doctors and prenatal care).28  While many of 
these QIPs do meet the needs of individuals in the population, there was no strategy or 
coordination among such projects to ensure that the needs of Liberian women and society as a 
whole were addressed systematically. 
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Evaluation 
On this criterion, UNMIL’s efforts have been inadequate.  The training and support to 
women in the elections was important but produced few results.  On a policy level, UNMIL was 
minimally involved in government actions following the elections.  In the justice sector, the LNP 
invested resources into recruiting and training women, but is still short of having any substantial 
representation of women in its ranks.  In the development realm, many projects directly 
benefiting women were funded, but there was no coherent strategy to ensure that women’s most 
pressing needs were met first and integrated into the whole society’s greatest needs. Clearly 
UNMIL is not making adequate efforts at mainstreaming on this criterion. 
2.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION 
Description29 
As another first for UNMIL, the mission’s mandate on developing the DDR program was 
the first to include special attention to the needs of women and children.30  The UNMIL gender 
unit had a heavy influence over the development of the DDR program.  This program collected 
weapons and ammunition, housed former combatants for a short period, and provided money and 
the option of education, training, or employment.  The gender unit’s influence resulted in women 
and girls being recognized as armed combatants and permitted to participate in the program. 
Furthermore, women who were associated with fighting forces (or WAFFs) were allowed to 
participate, although the program originally was only for individuals who carried weapons.  
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Women associated with fighting forces included women and children who traveled with 
contingents as cooks, domestic servants, and sexual slaves.  WAFFs were screened to confirm 
that they had been a part of the fighting forces.  In cantonment sites women had separate living 
facilities.  Additionally, the cantonment sites had gender-sensitive service providers, such as 
healthcare services for mothers of infants and nursing mothers.  Other services included 
assistance in reproductive health, counseling, sexual trauma support, education, and training on 
women’s rights.31 
Unfortunately, opening the DDR program to women did not automatically lead to 
women’s participation.  Women and girls feared being stigmatized for participating in the 
program because an overwhelming number of participants were men.  Thus, UNMIL made 
special efforts to reach out to women and make them aware of DDR services and their 
availability to women.  The final breakdown of participants in the DDR program was 101,495 
total with 22,370 (22%) women, 8,523 (8%) boys, and 2,440 (2%) girls.  UNMIL estimates that 
of the eligible women, 51% accessed the DDR program along with 58% of eligible girls. 
Overall, Liberia’s DDR program has been successful in that the country has remained 
peaceful.  However, the program was not without its flaws.  Partially because of the inclusion of 
WAFFs and CAFFs (Children Associated with Fighting Forces), and partially because of a 
requirement allowing eligibility for certain quantities of ammunition instead of just weapons, 
UNMIL was overwhelmed by the number of DDR participants.  The program was so 
overwhelmed that it was suspended for several months at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004.  
Even when the program began again, there were not enough places in employment, education, 
and other reintegration programs. 
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Evaluation 
The DDR program ultimately represents a program which had adequate mainstreaming 
efforts, especially in the planning stages.  Unfortunately, the results for both women and men 
have been less than ideal.  Regardless, UNMIL’s efforts to include women who were affected by 
the conflict in various ways were significant.  Furthermore, efforts to advertize the program to 
women and provide for women’s needs in cantonment sites also reflect conscious mainstreaming 
efforts. 
2.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
Description 
UNMIL’s response to GBV in Liberia has been overwhelmingly focused on public 
information campaigns.  Before describing UNMIL’s efforts on this criterion, some statistics 
provide perspective on the scope of the gender-based violence problem in Liberia.  According to 
a 2005 World Health Organization (WHO) survey, 91.7% of 1,216 women and girls interviewed 
stated that they were subjected to multiple violent acts during the conflict.32  Three quarters of 
these women and girls were sexually violated or raped.  Even after the Rape Amendment Act 
was adopted by the Liberian government in 2006, the rates of rape and violence against women 
did not subside.33  Furthermore, deficiencies in Liberia’s legal system and the prevalence of out 
of court settlements prevent these cases from being dealt with in the criminal justice system.34 
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To prevent and respond to these crimes, UNMIL’s gender unit worked with the Liberian 
government and the Ministry of Gender and Development to write and pass the 2006 Rape 
Amendment Act which increased penalties for crimes of rape.  Additionally, the gender unit 
assisted the Liberian Government to develop a National Action Plan on Gender.  This plan 
includes the following five planks: 
1) Strengthen the health sector to know how to respond to cases of Gender Based 
Violence and document clinical evidence; 
2) Strengthen the capacity of the legal system to effectively and efficiently deal with 
cases of GBV; 
3) Create a system of outreach, psychological support, and safe homes for survivors of 
GBV; 
4) Train social and health professionals in the skills they need; and 
5) Support economic and social empowerment of women and girls.35 
Although the plan is skeletal and lacks specific action steps and time tables, the broad goals are 
important steps for the Liberian government.  If the plan is followed even minimally, there is 
great potential for progress on this issue. 
Another way UNMIL responded to rape and GBV was the “Stop the Rape” campaign.  
This nationwide initiative coordinated by the gender unit had launch events in each county that 
featured concerts, actors, singers, comedians, and dramas.  Performers at the events were 
celebrities from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, who contributed their names and faces to 
endorse an end to rape and violence against women.36  Other public information campaigns on 
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GBV and SEA ran on UNMIL Radio in public service announcements and news features.37  
With the prevalence of radio as a means of communication in the country, these campaigns 
undoubtedly reached out to a diverse audience of listeners. 
 
Evaluation 
Ultimately, UNMIL makes inadequate efforts towards gender mainstreaming on this 
criterion.  Unfortunately, most of the efforts of UNMIL on this criterion were in the area of 
“preventing” GBV, as opposed to “responding to” GBV.  UNMIL’s efforts have done little to 
nothing for the women who have already endured GBV.  Furthermore, while public information 
campaigns are important, concrete efforts like training or providing resources to victims or the 
justice system to promote prosecution of these crimes may be a better use of UNMIL’s time and 
efforts. 
2.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT 
Description 
On this criterion, UNMIL has had both a few successes and some failures.  UNMIL is 
frequently touted for having the only female SRSG of any peacekeeping mission.  The SRSG is 
the top official in each mission country and the head of the political and military aspects of the 
peacekeeping mission.  In terms of women in leadership roles, UNMIL does have some right to 
be proud considering it has both a female SRSG and a female Deputy SRSG.  Support for 
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mainstreaming from these top levels has certainly contributed to Liberia’s success in many of the 
other categories.  Another reason Liberia is frequently praised for gender balance is that UNMIL 
had the first two entirely female civilian police units (both from India).38  Again, UNMIL’s 
mainstreaming efforts in areas like DDR and post-conflict reconstruction certainly benefited 
from the presence of these women. 
Unfortunately, the overall gender balance of UNMIL does not reflect the 
accomplishments of women in leadership positions.  A further disappointment in this criterion is 
UNMIL’s lack of data on gender balance within the various mission components.  The data that 
are available from 2004 and 2005 can be found in Figure 2-3. 
Figure 2-2: UNMIL military, civilian, and civilian police deployment 
Civilian Police, by date Total Deployed # of Women % Women 
          December 2004 1104 66 6% 
May 2004 640 32 5% 
Civilian staff, by date    
         December 2005 538 167 31% 
         June 2005 494 148 30% 
         March 2005 483 144.9 30% 
         September 2004 423 123 29.14% 
Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General 
In the reports containing numbers of civilian staff, there are no figures for military staff; 
however, the general trend in UN peacekeeping missions is that the proportions of military 
personnel are worse than those of the civilian police.  In August of 2006, the Department of 
Peacekeeping began keeping tabs on the gender balance of military personnel in all missions.  
This data for UNMIL can be found in Appendix A.  This data reflects women’s participation of 
approximately two percent for the last two and a half years.  This is certainly not reflective of a 
high commitment to gender balance. 
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Evaluation 
Both for the lack of recent data on civilian personnel and the poor balance in those data 
which do exist, UNMIL has made inadequate efforts at mainstreaming in this criterion.  Despite 
women in two top leadership positions and the all female police units, including a few hundred 
women among thousands of men does not approach gender balance.  Furthermore, using these 
women to mask the mission’s overall lack of gender balance is even more outrageous. 
2.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN 
PERSONNEL 
Description 
While UNMIL has developed many responses to GBV by UN personnel, the unfortunate 
aspect of these efforts is that they have been greatly needed.  While instances of SEA have 
decreased over time, in 2005, there were 45 allegations and in 2006 there were 30 allegations 
made against UNMIL personnel.39  In 2007, there was a substantial decline to only 9 
allegations.40  While this shows some improvement (see Figure 2-4), even one of these incidents 
abuses the local population’s trust enough that none are acceptable for a UN peacekeeping 
mission. 
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Figure 2-3: Reports of Sexual Assault and Abuse by UN personnel 
Report Date Number of Allegations, 
cumulative by year 
March 2008 3 
2007 Total 9 
August 2007 7 
March 2007 7 
2006 Total 30 
December 2006 28 
September 2006 24 
June 2006 18 
2005 Total 45 
December 2005 36 
June 2005 21 
Note: Figures from Reports of the Secretary General and UNMIL Press Releases 
 
UNMIL has responded to the issue of GBV by peacekeepers in several ways.  A free, 24-hour, 
confidential hotline was set-up for Liberians to report incidents of SEA by UN personnel.  
Additionally, a list of “off-limits” places for UNMIL personnel was created to ensure that UN 
personnel avoid locations known or reputed to condone prostitution, human trafficking, or 
narcotics use.  When reports of SEA by UN personnel are received, UNMIL conducts 
independent investigations and personnel who have substantiated allegations against them are 
repatriated for disciplinary proceedings.  Unfortunately, it took until 2006 for UNMIL’s Conduct 
and Discipline unit to be fully functioning; however the Office of Internal Oversight was 
processing cases prior to this date.  UNMIL has released annual or biannual reports which track 
and report on allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse since 2006, although numbers were 
reported in a less formal press release in 2005. 
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Evaluation  
Ultimately, UNMIL has made adequate efforts on this criterion.  While during the first 
couple years of the mission this was a serious issue, many efforts have been made to address the 
problem.  Especially in recent years, the number of allegations has decreased significantly.  
Additionally, UNMIL has taken steps to address issues as they have arisen and successfully 
completed numerous investigations. 
2.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING 
Description 
The main indication of UNMIL’s mainstreaming efforts is that nearly all reports of the 
Secretary General since December of 2004 include sections on “gender”.  These sections 
describe the work of the gender unit and major advances or setbacks for women and girls.  The 
first report of the Secretary General in December 2003 lacked a section on “gender”, while the 
May and September 2004 lacked a “gender” section but integrated gender reporting under other 
headings in the report.  Curiously, the March 2004 and March 2006 reports also lack a “gender” 
section and lack any information on mainstreaming efforts.  This reporting, while generally 
showing progress also has several curious inconsistencies. 
A second problem with the report of the Secretary General is the level of detail that they 
contain.  Even when women are mentioned, it is usually brief and appears to be the result of an 
individual compiling the report, not a systematic process.  Other times when women are 
mentioned it is in “features”, meaning that press releases or reports will sporadically include 
information on a successful program or organization, instead of including data on women 
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regularly in reporting on all programs.  Finally, data in areas such as gender balance and 
allegations of SEA, or gender disaggregated data in the DDR program, does not exist. 
 
Evaluation 
On this criterion, UNMIL has made inadequate efforts towards mainstreaming.  
Inconsistencies in reports of the Secretary General are one reason UNMIL’s efforts are 
inadequate.  Additionally, the missing data on gender balance DDR participants is especially 
troubling in evaluating the mission.  Finally, the lack of genuine representation of gender policies 
as integral to programs themselves, rather than a fulfillment of “separate” gender requirements 
shows the UNMIL’s efforts on this criterion are not adequate. 
2.8 SUMMARY 
Peacekeeping Operation     Adequate 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction     Inadequate 
DDR        Adequate 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Inadequate 
Gender Balance      Inadequate 
Preventing and Responding to GBV     Adequate 
 by UN personnel 
Monitoring and Reporting     Inadequate 
  
 
The most unique failure of UNMIL is in the area of reconstruction and development.  The 
UN is clearly grappling with what role the DPKO should play in development.  Historically, and 
still today, other UN agencies like UNDP and UNIFEM, the World Bank, and a plethora of 
NGOs play large roles in development in Liberia and other post-conflict nations.  This is 
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certainly the case in Liberia where many outside agencies, including large grants from the United 
States, are funding the country’s reconstruction.  However, because each of these organizations 
have their own goals, directives, and limitations, development is not always addressed 
systematically, either by the UN or collectively by all development agencies in a country.  The 
only institutional support for development within peacekeeping operations currently is QIP 
funds.  Although there is no official definition of what these funds should be used for, they are 
generally used for small-scale infrastructure projects with immediate impacts for the population.  
However, development is not the DPKO’s strength.   
Yet, peacekeeping personnel are frequently in a unique position in terms of 
understanding a country’s security situation; a situation which must be intertwined with 
development programs.41  Thus, using the resources of the peacekeeping missions to fill a 
greater role in development planning has potential to both foster effective development and 
ensure that development plans are mainstreamed to address the needs of women.  While some
countries have effective planning bodies within UN agencies or other organizations, Liberia is an 
example of a country in which such central planning has failed to bring success.  Dev
peacekeepers’ roles in development planning would allow peacekeeping missions to fill voids 
like this in other countries. 
 
eloping 
                                                
Another unique program of UNMIL was the DDR program, and this program is notable 
for its success.  This DDR program was the UN’s first with a specific gender sensitive mandate, 
and is a potential model for other missions.  The inclusion of women as participants, the 
provision of services in separate facilities for disarmament and demobilization, and the listening 
to women’s voices in reintegration programs were all important characteristics of the DDR 
 
41 For more on this, see 26 and 29 
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program’s success.  However, due to varying post-conflict situations, simply creating a program 
identical to UNMIL’s in other countries may not work.  The reason mainstreaming was 
successful in UNMIL’s DDR program was because the Office of Gender Affairs and local 
women were involved in planning and were able to communicate local women’s needs to the 
plan.  This participatory stage is a characteristic that is essential to apply in other programs. 
A second reason that this DDR program shows such promise for other countries is that 
UNMIL overcame significant challenges.  The program was suspended for several months 
because it was overwhelmed and could not provide proper security for program participants.  
However, after the suspension, the program continued as planned.  Other missions that 
experience significant security challenges have viewed mainstreaming as a perk or a bonus when 
it is possible.  Instead, Liberia makes a strong case for mainstreamed DDR programs being 
integral not just for women but for the peace and security of an entire country.42 
Another criterion on which UNMIL struggled to respond adequately was that of GBV.  
Writing about a trip to Liberia in mid-2008, AIDS activist Stephen Lewis said: “at the heart of 
this conference there lies an unassailable truth: if sexual violence is not addressed during the 
course of a conflict, then sexual violence will haunt the post-conflict period, and make of the 
ostensible peace a mockery for half the population.”43  UNMIL’s main strategy to respond to the 
issue was through many kinds of public information campaigns.  A 2007 report of Action Aid 
recommends several actions in which UNMIL could improve it’s response: legal and judicial 
interventions, training on gender sensitivity for UNMIL staff, central standardized reporting 
section, capacity building for women’s organizations, sensitively discouraging customary law 
practices, increasing support of LNP through human resources and funds, further training on 
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women’s rights for UN civilian police and LNP, training for legal personnel especially on the 
new rape law, and support for the prison system.44  Essentially, these recommendations reflect 
that while public information campaigns are an important part of a long-term strategy, more 
pragmatic tactics are required in the short-term. 
Despite the difficulties UNMIL had responding to GBV in Liberian society, the mission 
was one of only a few successful in addressing the issue of SEA by UN peacekeepers.  The 
steady decrease of incidents from 2005 through 2008 is unique.  Not only was UNMIL tracking 
and reporting on this important data, but the numbers show results!  There is likely no one 
program or factor that caused this accomplishment.  Several measures could have influenced the 
success, including: limits on where personnel could travel, training sessions, and the influence of 
the gender advisor.  Furthermore, having women in UNMIL’s top two leadership positions who 
are committed to ending SEA by UN personnel certainly also had some influence over results.  
Thus, there may not be one formula for success in this category, but a broad approach to 
mainstreaming and gender sensitivity across the entire mission is essential. 
Ultimately, UNMIL’s evaluations reflect average success at mainstreaming within a 
peacekeeping operation.  UNMIL was effective on some criteria and ineffective on others.  
Overall, the influence of the institutional culture (as reflected by success on the first criteria), 
allowed the mission to overcome obstacles on other criteria.  However, many areas are in need of 
greater mainstreaming attention.  Consider this program as a model of mixed success in moving 
through the next three case studies. 
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3.0  UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC) 
Of all the countries examined in this paper, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
has the most ongoing violence and perhaps the worst reputation.  The conflict and humanitarian 
situation in the country, even since the start of MONUC, is horrendous.  As usual, women bear 
the brunt of the problems – rape by armed forces, rape by UN Peacekeepers, poverty, and forced 
displacement.  While MONUC has begun to address some of these problems, because basic 
peace and security do not exist, many of MONUC’s mainstreaming efforts have been hindered or 
subordinated to security tasks.  Specifically, MONUC’s operates more like a 20th century 
observer mission than a modern multi-dimensional operation.  The mission’s activities are highly 
concentrated in monitoring and reporting on ceasefire violations which frequently include 
incidents of rape or violence against women and civilians.  Because MONUC is struggling to 
document and deter these crimes, other mandate components like DDR, reconstruction, and 
development are lacking in mainstreaming efforts. 
 
History45 
In 1996, many diverse groups in the DRC were sparring over resources and national and 
ethnic sovereignty.  The main nations participating in the conflict were Rwanda, Uganda, 
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Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola.  In 1997, Laurent Kabila’s Tutsi forces, supported mostly by 
Rwanda won control of the capital city Kinshasa.  Kabilia then declared himself President.  
Many foreign forces refused to leave and fighting flared up again in 1998.  In July 1999, all six 
countries came together to sign the Lusaka ceasefire agreement.  The UN’s involvement in the 
DRC conflict began with a limited force of ceasefire monitors.  In February of 2000, UN 
Resolution 1291 established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo or MONUC. 
MONUC’s original mandate included activities such as: monitoring and assisting with 
the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, supervising troop redeployment and a 
program for DDRR, facilitating humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring (with 
particular attention to “vulnerable groups” like women and children), and developing a demining 
program. 
 
Women in the DRC 
Women in the DRC were very organized on issues of equality prior to MONUC 
operations.  A workshop hosted by MONUC in 2003 summarized the history of women in the 
DRC as having “evolved from one of full participation before the colonial era to one of 
marginalization in the colonial era leading to powerlessness, to almost total exclusion from 
decision-making levels.”46  Despite this current exclusion, women did have rights prior to the 
civil war.  There was a gender equality law and women had the right to vote and the right to own 
and inherit property.  Unfortunately, some women did not experience these rights because other 
laws and traditional practices within families, the markets, and village councils contradicted the 
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equality laws.47  Women who were not restrained by these factors organized and advocated for 
themselves and for the DRC’s peace process.  During the ceasefire negotiations, women’s 
organizations held simultaneous dialogues about how to enhance their roles in the peace process.  
Over 150 women’s organizations in Kinshasa organized around the peace process.48  The 
Women’s Network for the Defense of Rights and Peace in the Kivus organized despite threats 
from local police.  Their office was raided and their peaceful demonstrations were disrupted and 
disbanded as a “security threat”.49  Clearly, women in the DRC were motivated and ready to take 
part in all aspects of the DRC’s society. 
3.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Because MONUC was created prior to Resolution 1325, there was a slight lag in the 
implementing of mainstreaming.  MONUC’s gender unit was created two years after the start of 
the mission and seventeen months after Resolution 1325 in March of 2002.  The unit was staffed 
by one senior gender advisor, her deputy, two UN volunteers, an administrative officer, and two 
local officers.50  The first gender advisor was Amy Smythe of Sierra Leone.  Since the creation 
of the gender unit, UN reports have not included much information on the unit’s activities.  The 
unit published a 2003 Activities Report which describes the first year of the gender unit’s work.  
The report expresses the unit’s two-pronged strategy as follows:  
                                                 
47 22-1272 
48 22-1275. 
49 22-1275. 
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“The first prong was to integrate a gender perspective within MONUC itself. The 
second was to work with the Congolese population and society to bring the 
realities of the conflict as they especially affect women, to the attention of 
decision makers in the peace process and the Transition.”51   
The gender unit pursues this strategy without its own budget.  This is a special challenge 
because, unlike in UNMIL, the gender advisor had to work to explain her role and earn 
commitment from the mission’s leadership.  In fact, traveling to various MONUC offices to meet 
field staff was the majority of the senior gender advisor’s work during the first several weeks and 
months of the unit’s operation.52 
Although the unit has two-fold mission, a much greater proportion of their work is 
external mainstreaming.  The 2003 report of the gender office’s activities is primarily a summary 
of the gender advisor’s meetings with various civil society groups (e.g. schools, universities, 
churches, women’s groups, and NGOs) throughout the country.  This networking is important, 
but the gender unit needs to follow up with parties to ensure they are implementing programs and 
policies that support women.  Externally, the gender unit worked with local women’s groups and 
civil society institutions.  The gender unit has supported these groups by organizing and 
participating in several conferences for women leaders.  With the unit’s support, women’s 
groups have organized marches and demonstrations to commemorate International Women’s 
Day and other days of recognition for women.  Working with Réseau Action Femmes, 
MONUC’s gender unit prepared a campaign against violence against women.53  The gender unit 
also helped women to lobby for a voice in the peace process and in government and electoral 
                                                 
51 28-N/A 
52 28-N/A 
53 77-12 
 35 
politics.  Finally, the gender unit advocated for DRC Universities to offer seminars on 
CEDAW.54 
The main internal activity of the gender unit is running trainings for UN personnel.  The 
gender unit recognizes the importance of holding these trainings systematically in order to reach 
all MONUC personnel.55  Unfortunately, reporting on these trainings has not been included 
consistently in progress reports of the Secretary General.  A 2005 report of the Secretary General 
stated that, by the end of that June, 400 members of all UN units will have received the induction 
training.56  While perhaps systematic, this total is low compared to the over 15,000 civilian, 
military, and civilian police personnel deployed in the country.  One consequence of the failure 
to train more staff is a failure of mainstreaming in other programs and high numbers of rape and 
SEA by UN personnel.57  Another training program emblematic of MONUC’s failure on this 
criterion was a United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) seminar requested 
by the MONUC gender unit.  This optional training on women and their human rights was highly 
rated by participants, but had low attendance (only 101 participants).58 
Another, smaller task of the gender unit is public information campaigns.  The unit has 
accomplished this by partnering with the UN radio station, Radio Okapi.  At the urging of the 
gender advisor, the station has taken steps to include coverage of women and women’s issues on 
the station.  Some mainstreamed programs include interviews of women and women’s 
organizations participating in the peace process, a program on the kinds of violence against 
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women, and a series on women’s legal, economic, and social post-conflict needs.59  
Additionally, for International Women’s Day 2004, a public information video on sexual 
violence against women was produced.60 
                                                
 
Evaluation 
In this criterion, MONUC has made inadequate efforts in mainstreaming.  In particular, 
there is not an organizational culture that supports the gender unit and gender mainstreaming.  
The gender advisor and gender unit have accomplished much; especially the strong network of 
relationships with many women’s and civil society groups.  However, without the support of the 
mission’s top leadership, the gender unit is limited in their actions.  Internal mainstreaming 
activities or even attempts are non-existent because there is no strong example of effective use of 
the gender unit’s expertise.  Furthermore, the internal mainstreaming and trainings that the unit 
has attempted have failed to produce results.  For these reasons, MONUC receives inadequate 
marks in this criterion. 
3.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
Description 
In this criterion, MONUC is at a much earlier stage than most of the other missions 
because of the lack of peace and security in the country.  Despite this, MONUC has made 
mainstreaming efforts in the national dialogue, the truth and reconciliation committee, the 
 
59 41-12 
60 84-16 
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elections, the justice system, and development.  In preparation for the national dialogue, women 
organized in Nairobi, Kenya in 2002 and developed the Nairobi Declaration.  This document 
included a plea for peace and demands that the new Constitution include CEDAW (already 
ratified by the DRC in 1986) and other mainstreaming efforts like affirmative action, quotas for 
decision-making bodies, prosecution for rape, and access for women to land and resources. The 
declaration also demanded that gender sensitivity be mainstreamed throughout the peace process 
and that the facilitator of the national dialogue incorporate the Nairobi Declaration into the 
dialogue.61  However, these demands were not easily granted.  Although MONUC’s gender unit 
lobbied to include women, ultimately women made up only 10% of the participants.62  MONUC 
responded to this injustice by training women and then smuggling them into national dialogue 
sessions as “experts”.  MONUC’s efforts allowed 34 women to participate as delegates and an 
additional 34 as experts.63 
Following the 2003 dialogue process, the DRC began developing their transitional 
constitution and transitional government.  This process did not allow for significant levels of 
women’s participation.  Although Article 51 of the transitional constitution stated that women 
should have “meaningful representation”, this was not the case.  Women in the transitional 
government were represented as follows: 6/36 Ministers, 2/25 vice ministers, 2/8 National 
Assembly members, no Senate members, and 1/8 members of the Independent Electoral 
Commission.64  Attempts to include women in the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections 
did result in a few more women serving. 
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Perhaps MONUC’s most significant contribution to post-conflict reconstruction has been 
their work to involve women in the electoral process.  While occasionally ineffective, MONUC 
did create some mainstreaming initiatives.  During the drafting of the DRC’s new constitution, 
MONUC coordinated civic education programs with local and international partners especially 
targeted at women.65  However, in terms of percentages, the 2006 election still resulted in poor 
representation of women; women became 9/60 (15%) total government officials, 42/500 (8.4%) 
National Assembly Members, 5/108 (4.6%) Senators, 43/690 (6.2%) Provincial Assembly 
members, and 1/22 (4.5%) governor or vice governors.66  Once the new government was in 
place, MONUC remained minimally involved in government policy.  The mission is working 
with the government to develop a national plan on 1325 and MONUC is reviewing women’s 
rights legislation to ensure that it conforms to international standards.67 
In the justice system, MONUC has assisted with the implementation of prison reform.  
Following the war, the DRC’s prisons were in shambles.  In some cases, prisons shut down 
because of their inability to provide food or basic security for prisoners.  In other cases, the 
prison director is forced to allow prisoners to roam the town and forge for their own meals, lest 
they starve to death.68  Lack of an effective incarceration system caused war criminals and 
rapists to continue to pose a threat to civil society.  Additionally, female prisoners, including 
pregnant and nursing mothers, did not have separate prison facilities.  Not only did these women 
lack privacy, but their personal security was also threatened by the male prisoners and rapists 
whom they were imprisoned with.69  MONUC was able to advocate for the female prisoners and 
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help build the infrastructure for separate female units in one county prison.70  MONUC also used 
QIP funds to rehabilitate prisons in Lubumbashi, Kindu, Kinshasa and Kisangani.71  Another 
aspect of the justice system MONUC has worked with is the new police force in the DRC.  
Specifically, the gender unit has provided training and training on gender sensitive issues.  In 
2002, MONUC had a train the trainers program in which MONUC trained trainers in the local 
police forces to effectively disseminate gender sensitivity information.72 
                                                
Finally, MONUC has conducted a few development projects for women in the DRC.  
One program for female journalists trains women in the methods of journalism.  The program’s 
goal is to eventually make these women leaders and role models for other girls and young 
women.73  A second MONUC development project that targets women is the revitalization of the 
healthcare system.  MONUC recognized a serious need for healthcare facilities and so the 
mission’s third QIP was a healthcare center with labor and delivery facilities.74  However, 
MONUC neglected to create a systematic, mainstreamed plan for reconstruction projects.   
 
Evaluation 
Unfortunately, the failure to create a systematic, mainstreamed plan affected many of 
MONUC’s efforts on this criterion.  Although the reconstruction activities of the mission as a 
whole are reduced, efforts that have been made have no overarching plan.  In the elections, 
MONUC had some success at reaching out to women voters, but there were many groups 
involved in these efforts and few details on MONUC’s program.  In the government and justice 
 
70 21-N/A 
71 98-10 
72 75-12 
73 126-N/A and 129-N/A 
74 4-N/A 
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system, MONUC’s efforts were generally quick fix solutions that have few demonstrable or 
long-term effects.  Thus, MONUC’s efforts on this criterion are inadequate. 
3.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION 
Description75 
MONUC’s mandate included the development of a DDR/DDRR program.  MONUC’s 
original intention was to make the DDRR program a model in gender-sensitivity.76  However, 
despite a commitment from the highest levels towards this goal, basic failures in implementation 
have caused problems and challenges for the DDRR program’s gender sensitive components. 
The DDRR program first faced the challenge of incorporating women who made up 
approximated 15-20% of the Congolese army.77  In addition to women affected by the DDRR 
process as armed combatants, women were affected if they participated in non-combat roles for 
armed militias, or if their husbands or heads of household were combatants.  However, since the 
beginning of the DDRR program, women were hesitant to approach DDRR staff and begin the 
demobilization process.  Schroeder lists a few possible reasons for this including: MONUC’s 
DDRR staff does not reflect gender balance, the classification system is subjective causing 
women dependents or non-combatant support-staff to fail to qualify, or dependents not receiving 
separate consultations or assistance for their reintegration or repatriation needs.78 
                                                 
75 For a full gendered analysis of this program, see 23 
76 72-4 
77 22-1273. 
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 Once women are accepted into the DDRR program, they may face further challenges.  
For example, the lack of interpreters of local languages prevents women from reporting sexual 
abuse that they have experienced.79  Beyond that, demobilization centers and repatriation camps 
do not always have separate facilities for women and children.  Furthermore, the economic 
integration programs that exist for women are more frequently “token” programs than a 
systematic approach to reintegration for women.80  Finally, in the repatriation process, women 
can be “forced” either through economic dependence or societal pressures to travel to their 
husband’s home country. 81 
 
Evaluation 
Ultimately, MONUC again makes inadequate efforts on this criterion.  While a portion of 
this failure was out of MONUC’s control, other simple mainstreaming tasks are absent.  Clearly, 
more resources are focused on basic peace without including gender concerns - the antithesis of 
mainstreaming.  Despite challenges of ceasefire violations and ongoing violence, MONUC can 
do more.82  Having interpreters and separate consultations and facilities for women is a basic 
necessity that has been included in many other DDR programs.  Thus, it is not only that 
MONUC’s ability to pull together a DDR program for the thousands of combatants has been 
inadequate, but also their mainstreaming efforts within that program. 
                                                 
79 23-19 
80 23-26 
81 23-30 
82 60 describes an interesting program called the Disarmament and Community Reintegration Program (DCR) in 
Ituri under the Dar es Salaam Act.  This program targets communities as a whole without distinguishing between 
combatants and non-combatants and thus provides benefits with a holistic approach. 
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3.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
Description 
This criterion is perhaps the biggest part of MONUC’s gender work.  Unfortunately, this 
focus is critical because of the prevalence of rape and sexual exploitation in the DRC.  From 
2005 to 2007, 14,200 cases of rape were recorded.83  In the first six months of 2007 alone, there 
were 4,500 sexual violence cases reported (meaning at least that many cases went unreported as 
well).84  Rape in the DRC is perpetrated most frequently by members of various armed forces.  
An investigation in 2007 stated that: “in South Kivu and the Ituri, while non-state armed groups 
remain the main perpetrators of sexual violence, close to 20% of all cases of sexual violence are 
reportedly committed by the FARDC and the PNC.”85  Members of the Congolese national 
military (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (PNC) are occasionally held accountable, 
but are reluctant to hand over senior officers.86  In other situations, perpetrators avoid 
accountability by making outside settlements, receiving bail without a court date, or receiving 
light sentences.87 
A 2006 report of the Secretary General identifies several of the challenges to addressing 
GBV in the DRC:  the country is geographically large, the immense extent of rape by the armed 
forces is compounded by rape in civil society, it is difficult to reach child victims, and the 
majority of perpetrators go unpunished.88  For example, of the 14,200 cases between 2005 and 
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2007, only 287 of them were taken to court.89  For perpetrators that are convicted, sentences for 
GBV and rape are frequently lenient and the deficient prison system exacerbates the lack of 
consequences for rapists.  A 2006 law on sexual violence attempted to increase convictions by 
raising the age of minors from 14 to 18, making sex with a minor illegal, and raising penalties for 
rape and sexual harassment.  The law also attempted to address corruption by outlawing political 
immunity for sexual crimes.  The government’s commitment reflected in this law is significant; 
however, rape continues to be a widespread problem.90  In March of 2008, MONUC held a 
workshop to make women aware of these changes and their rights.91 
Instead of enforcing laws on GBV, MONUC has focused on documenting violations and 
engaging in limited awareness-raising programs.  One of the first attempts to address the issue of 
GBV was in 2002 when the gender unit began discussions on a plan of action to address violence 
against women, especially in the east of the country.92  They began a comprehensive study in 
2004 on the issue.93  The following year, a Sexual Violence Working Group was formed and 
developed training and advocacy packages which were distributed to the Congolese military, 
police, and judiciary.94  The working group also began a review of Congolese law on the issue of 
sexual violence.95  MONUC attempted to address the problems with the legal system by holding 
trainings for lawyers and magistrates beginning in 2005.96  In April 2008, a training session was 
held for 200 military magistrates and judicial police inspectors on how to properly investigate 
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and prosecute sexual crimes.97  An additional 300 people are set to be trained.  Finally, in 2008 
an additional UN senior advisor was deployed to the country to collect and analyze data and 
develop a national plan.98 
Another set of MONUC programs were QIPs targeted at women who experienced GBV.  
One program provided assistance to 1,000 survivors of GBV and trained local NGOs and women 
leaders on preventative measures.99  Two years later, MONUC conducted a joint initiative to 
document reports of GBV and coordinate NGO partners on medical, legal, and psychosocial 
support.100  Another program on International Women’s Day 2004 created a thirty minute video 
on sexual violence against women and distributed the program to local media sources.101  
However, MONUC programs still have a problem because female victims who receive either 
medical or psychological support do not receive legal assistance.102 
 
Evaluation 
While sexual abuse and gender based violence are still problems in the DRC, this is one 
area in which the mission has effectively used the expertise of the gender unit and implemented 
programs to address the problem.  MONUC has committed a large number of resources – 
human, programmatic, money, etc. – to address this issue.  Studies and other monitoring are 
ongoing and MONUC recognizes the gravity of the situation.  Furthermore, by cooperating with 
NGOs, MONUC has made efforts to provide for victims of these crimes.  Thus, MONUC has 
made adequate efforts on this criterion. 
                                                 
97 115-12 
98 118-16 
99 84-15 
100 106-11 
101 84-16 
102 115-11 
 45 
3.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT 
Description 
MONUC has an exceptionally poor record in this criterion.  Gender balance within 
MONUC staff is hardly documented, while the records that do exist reflect poorly on the 
mission.  A 2003 report of the gender advisor indicates that the gender balance is in fact getting 
worse.103  Furthermore, there has not been any real effort to change this fact.  Gender 
disaggregated data is available for only one year in reports of the Secretary General.  In 2004, 
women made up 4/117 civilian police, 31/736 military observers, and 146/10,008 military 
units.104  The civilian police statistics from 2003 are particularly troubling - before June 2003, 1 
out of 15 CIVPOL officers were women, by June 9, 3 out of 69 officers were women, and in 
October 3 out of 90 officers were women.105  A consequence of these statistics is that “victims, 
usually female, have repeatedly intimated that the sight of a male officer in uniform makes them 
re-live the experience of the violation all over again.”106  Thus, the lack of gender balance has 
consequences in at least two other criteria – preventing and responding to GBV and preventing 
and responding to GBV by UN Peacekeepers.  Appendix B contains the data on MONUC 
military personnel from August 2006 through January 2009.  Unfortunately, the percent of 
women reflected in this data is generally just under two percent and never about even 2.5%. 
Women in leadership roles fair just about as well as those in the rest of the mission.  In 
the gender affairs office, the senior gender advisor is a woman.  In 2008, Leila Zerrougui, a 
woman from Algeria, was appointed as a second Deputy SRSG for MONUC.  However, adding 
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one additional woman does not change the overall poor gender balance.  Whether or not this 
addition will affect any of MONUC’s programs in the other criteria may be a positive side 
benefit. 
 
Evaluation 
 MONUC has made no efforts in this criterion.  The mission has not kept data on the 
mission’s deployment, but the data that does exist indicates extreme disparity.  Furthermore, 
even once the problem was recognized, no additional recruiting programs were created. 
3.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN 
PERSONNEL 
Description 
As in all UN peacekeeping operations, MONUC enforces the UN’s zero-tolerance policy 
on SEA.  Unfortunately, MONUC personnel have blemished the UN’s reputation on peacekeeper 
conduct with many cases of SEA by peacekeepers.  Accusations have risen into the hundreds, as 
shown in Figure 3-1.   
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Figure 3-1:  Reports of Sexual Assault and Abuse by UN personnel 
Report Date Number of 
Allegations 
Number of 
Convictions
July 2008 ? 4 
April 2008 ? 6 
November 2007 ? 11 
March 2007  
(reports 2006 totals) 
176 ? 
December 2005 
(for Dec. 04-Oct. 05) 
167 78 
September 2005 
(for Dec. 04-Sep. 05) 
? 25 
August 2005 
(for Dec. 04-Jun. 05 
77 46 
December 2004 
(for Jun.-Sep. 04) 
72 8 
Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General 
These numbers have drawn the attention of UN leadership and NGO and media reports.  In 
February of 2005, the Secretary General issued a special letter stating:  
The unconscionable conduct of a small number of peacekeepers now clouds this 
distinguished record of collective achievement and individual sacrifice. I have 
stated publicly my personal outrage at the revelations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of Congolese children and women by some United Nations personnel 
assigned to MONUC.107 
 
Furthermore, a Human Rights Watch investigation uncovered that  
MONUC personnel have been involved in a pattern of sexual exploitation of 
Congolese women and girls. We interviewed girls, some as young as 13-years old, 
who had been raped by MONUC soldiers. We also spoke to girls aged between 12 
and 15 who engaged in what is commonly called “survival sex”—sexual relations 
they entered into in order to get some food, money or protection.108 
 
Clearly, the prevalence of SEA by UN peacekeepers is an endemic problem which has seriously 
affected the reputation of MONUC and UN peacekeeping as a whole. 
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The original plan for dealing with personnel issues was a four-step rapid response action 
plan: 1) investigation, 2) deterrence, 3) an emergency taskforce, and 4) a public relations and 
information campaign.109  However, after the publicity MONUC received for its failures in this 
area, additional action plans were developed in 2005 around standards of conduct, the complaint 
mechanism, support and assistance for victims, and training.110  In addition, a network of SEA 
focal points throughout MONUC offices was reactivated.111  Also in 2005, an office for 
addressing SEA in MONUC was formed.  This unit continues to work with the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services which investigates allegations made against MONUC personnel.  
Unfortunately, the OIOS has been inefficient and delayed investigations, allowing for a culture 
of impunity.112 
In addition to bureaucratic changes, MONUC has addressed the problem of SEA through 
a variety of trainings.  Conduct and discipline training on SEA is included in induction training 
for all MONUC personnel.  In 2006 two train the trainers programs were held to train 40 new 
training officers.113  Other attempts at concrete solutions to SEA have included a curfew for UN 
personnel, fencing and lighting around UN facilities, and the requirement that personnel wear 
their uniforms at all times to prevent individuals from masquerading as anonymous civilians and 
committing acts of GBV or SEA.114 
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Evaluation 
Fortunately, many of MONUC’s more recent efforts have been successful at reducing the 
number of conduct issues.  However, the amount of time, years in fact, that it took for MONUC 
to respond to these issues reflect very poorly on their efforts towards mainstreaming on this 
criterion.  Furthermore, the lack of follow-up on many convictions and the tolerance MONUC 
had for these crimes is unacceptable.  While MONUC has improved significantly, its efforts on 
this criterion are inadequate. 
3.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING 
Description 
Reports of the Secretary General on MONUC have an inconsistent representation of 
women. When women are included, they are frequently depicted as victims or as a “vulnerable” 
demographic in need of protection.115  SEA and GBV are mentioned fairly consistently, but the 
reports are similarly formatted – a report of an incident or incidents, the number of people 
affected, and the legal action taken, if any.116  The number of reports in this repetitive format 
does draw attention to violence against women, but unfortunately they lack solutions or an 
adequate response by MONUC. 
In addition to the negative coverage women receive in these reports, important 
mainstreaming information is missing.  The only mainstreamed programs that are included are 
those involving GBV or SEA.  In other areas like the mission’s deployment, the DRC’s new 
                                                 
115 See 67-4, 73-8, 77-12, 89-10, etc. 
116 72-10, 84-10, 81-8, 81-10, 81-11, 81-32, 82-13, 94-6, 94-11, 89-11, 89-14, 98-11, and 106-4  
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police force, or the participants in the DDRR program sex-disaggregated data is missing.  The 
office of gender affairs released only one report over five years ago!  Ongoing documentation of 
gender programs is severely lacking. 
 
Evaluation 
For the significant absences of data and the poor coverage of women when they are 
included, MONUC again has made inadequate efforts towards mainstreaming.  While some 
information about women is included, this does not document important mainstreaming 
programs or their results.  Additionally, descriptions of women as a “vulnerable group” in ways 
that are limiting and dismissive are not acceptable. 
3.8 SUMMARY 
Peacekeeping Operation     Inadequate  
Post-Conflict Reconstruction     Inadequate 
DDR        Inadequate 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Adequate 
Gender Balance      None 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Inadequate 
 by UN personnel 
Monitoring and Reporting     Inadequate 
 
 
MONUC’s overall record is very poor – with only one criterion on which the mission has 
adequately attempted mainstreaming efforts.  If MONUC conveys one message with regard to 
mainstreaming in peacekeeping it is this: despite UN commitments to mainstreaming and human 
rights, these concerns are secondary to establishing basic peace.  Because rebel factions and 
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foreign militias are still operating in the DRC, MONUC has focused on documenting ceasefire 
violations and gauging commitment of various factions to the peace process.  Conducting 
community development and empowerment, especially empowerment of women, is not seen as 
an effective route to peace.  Unfortunately, this view directly contradicts many of the platforms 
of Resolution 1325, including: 
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal 
participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and 
promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision- 
making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.117 
 
Undoubtedly one of the greatest influences over MONUC’s commitment to 
mainstreaming is the overall ineffectiveness of the operation’s culture and the gender unit.  In 
MONUC, some ideas about the incorporation of women and gender issues predated Resolution 
1325; however, the mandate and the creation of a gender unit occurred several months after the 
mission’s origin.  It is possible that this contributed minimally to the failure of some of 
MONUC’s mainstreaming efforts.  According to the 2008 Women, Peace, and Security Report: 
The incorporation of gender perspectives from the inception of a mandate has 
proven to be crucial. Gender advisers participated in inter-agency assessment 
missions conducted prior to the establishment of the mandates of operations in 
Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia, which resulted in a better reflection of 
gender issues in reports submitted to the Security Council prior to the 
establishment of peacekeeping operations in these four countries and translated 
into explicit references to gender issues in the ensuing Security Council 
resolutions.118 
 
However, once the gender unit began working, MONUC’s leadership did not modify its 
ideologies, programs, or mission priorities.  This lack of support from the leadership forced the 
gender unit to cooperate primarily with external organizations and thus contributed to failures on 
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other criteria.  As described in the 2003 Report of the Office of Gender Affairs, “skepticism, 
which was exhibited at the outset when the OGA was inaugurated, is slowly giving way to a 
readiness to listen and get involved in the process of reflection and analysis by many staff 
members.”119  This displays that there was a period of at least a year before the gender office 
even began gaining interest and support from the rest of the mission. 
Secondly, the DRC is the country with likely the worst reputation and reality of rape by 
armed factions – both local parties and UN personnel.  While the UN should more easily be able 
to handle the conduct of its own personnel, women actually requested that the UN focus on rape 
by others.  A Haitian woman quoted in a 2004 Human Rights Watch report says: “yes it is true 
that some girls have been raped by U.N. soldiers, but so many more have been brutally raped by 
other armed groups. Please focus on stopping this as it brings us so much more pain and 
suffering.”120  MONUC has indeed followed this advice.  The gender unit has used resources to 
document the problem of rape and GBV in civil society and provided resources to victims and 
legal and policy advice.  While incidents are still occurring, MONUC has begun the long process 
of raising-awareness and bringing about societal change. 
In terms of addressing violence by UN personnel, action was taken much too late after a 
culture of impunity allowed the problem to multiply.  As the 2004 Human Rights Watch report 
affirms, “Staff will only realize that such behavior has consequences if the U.N. leadership 
shows resolve in dealing with the problem.”121  As in UNMIL, other factors contribute to the 
mission’s success or failure in this category – however, in MONUC other factors were more 
negative than positive.  Lack of leadership commitment to the issue and lack of gender balance 
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both also fostered MONUC’s failures in this area.  Although recent data is not available on the 
issue, neither are reports that the problem has been effectively addressed.  Suggestions for 
solutions to these issues – gender balance, monitoring and reporting, and preventing and 
responding to GBV by UN personnel – will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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4.0  UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH) 
Moving out of the African continent, in Haiti there is a conflict of a different nature.  
Haiti’s conflict results from political instability and years of changing regimes and illegitimate 
elections.  The security threats are violent urban gangs as opposed to large rebel militias.  
Despite the differing cause and manifestation of conflict, the challenges faced by women are not 
drastically different; Haitian women too face challenges of gaining recognition and leadership 
roles in Haitian society.  Unlike MONUC, MINUSTAH began gender mainstreaming efforts in 
the mission’s planning stages.  While this has had benefits to the mission internally, externally, 
MINUSTAH has still faced challenges in areas like the Haitian elections and responding to 
GBV. 
 
History122 
Haiti’s conflict began after the country’s first democratic elections in 1990 which brought 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency.  A coup the following year removed Aristide from 
power leading to a series of elections throughout the 1990’s.  These elections were challenged as 
illegitimate by various members of the international community, in particular the United States, 
France, and Canada.  Between 1994 and 2001, four UN peacekeeping missions operated in Haiti.  
In 2000, Aristide returned from exile in the Central African Republic and claimed to have won 
                                                 
122 The information in this section comes from 11 and 80 
 55 
the election despite voter turnout under 10%.  Following this election, CARICOM, Canada, the 
EU, France, the O.A.S, and the U.S. mediated an action plan in January of 2004.  Under this 
plan, Aristide remained President.  However, armed opposition forces gained enough strength, to 
cause Aristide to resign.  He was replaced according to the Haitian Constitution by the President 
of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexendre.  Just months later, in April 2004, the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti began. 
MINUSTAH’s initial mandate included three major activities – creating and maintaining 
a secure and stable environment, supporting the political process, and monitoring and promoting 
human rights.  These broad goals included the more specific tasks of restructuring the Haitian 
National Police (HNP) and providing them with training (including gender training), a 
comprehensive DDR program for all armed groups (including women), assisting the transitional 
government in national reconciliation, supporting democratic presidential and parliamentary 
elections that all citizens (including women) participate in, and protecting the human rights of 
women and children.  This comprehensive mandate is laudable, especially because it mentions 
specific attention to women in areas other than human rights and protection.  Whether this act of 
linguistic inclusion led to greater commitment to mainstreaming issues will be examined in the 
following sections. 
 
Women in Haiti 
Prior to MINUSTAH, women in Haiti were making institutional progress towards 
equality.  Haiti ratified international human rights conventions with implications for women such 
as CEDAW in 1981 and, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women in 1997.  In 1994, the government established the 
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Ministry of Women’s Affairs.  Women’s organizations like Fanm Yo La, the Lambi Fund, and 
others were in operation prior to MINUSTAH, and the mission built on the strength of these 
groups.  The major problems facing women in Haiti were correlated with Haiti’s high poverty 
rates, poverty being more likely to affect women.  Specifically, women-headed households 
experience poverty rates of 26% in the suburbs and 64% in urban areas, compared to rates of 
17% and 48%, respectively, for male-headed households.123  One partial explanation for this 
discrepancy is that women have difficulty getting salaried jobs.  Another related explanation is 
women’s rates of education and literacy.  Although school enrollment rates do not reflect major 
disparity (45.3% for girls and 46.6% for boys between the ages of 6 and 24), literacy rates do.  
Only 48% of women are literate, while the rate for men is 61%.124  Despite these challenges, 
women in Haiti are organizing, and, with the support of MINUSTAH, mainstreaming efforts are 
slowly trickling into Haitian society. 
4.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Description 
The MINUSTAH Gender Affairs Unit was created at the mission’s inception.  In 2004, 
the MINUSTAH gender unit included a senior gender advisor and a national program officer 
while recruitment for additional personnel was ongoing.125  The senior gender advisor was 
Nadine Puechguirbal, formerly a gender advisor for MONUC.  The unit’s main projects have 
been training programs, ending violence against women, and promoting women’s participation 
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in the elections.  Some of the unit’s training programs were induction trainings on gender issues 
for the first MINUSTAH staff members.  These sessions at the beginning of the mission were 
particularly helpful because all staff could consider mainstreaming at the beginning of their 
projects.  This has specific impacts on mainstreaming in the DDR program and the elections 
planning program, as will be evident in the following sections.  Unfortunately, after the 
mission’s initial stages, the amount of time allotted for induction training has been limited.  
Furthermore, these trainings now must incorporate SEA information in addition to gender 
sensitivity information.126  A second shortcoming of the trainings is the inability of the gender 
unit to train military units stationed outside of the capitol Port-au-Prince.  Despite these added 
challenges, an interesting accomplishment of MINUSTAH’s induction training is that sessions 
are run by a Haitian male program officer.  This is an accomplishment because, as one civilian 
police trainee commented, “he was glad to hear a ‘real man’ deliver such a course instead of a 
woman…it gave the course more credibility.”127   
A second project of the gender affairs unit has been working towards a National Plan of 
Action to combat violence against women.  To create the plan, the gender unit has collaborated 
extensively with other UN agencies, Haiti’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Rights, and local 
women’s groups.128  These relationships have led to productive networking for future 
mainstreaming endeavors in civil society.  The gender unit has provided training and capacity-
building for women and assisted with advocacy efforts of women’s associations.  For example, 
the gender unit partnered with UNIFEM and two local groups – Famn Yo La and the Center for 
Commitment, Responsibility and Capacity Building (CERAC) – to develop women’s leadership 
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through a coaching program for women leaders.129  In another project, the unit has assisted a 
network of Haitian men to create an NGO for men that conduct grassroots advocacy on cultural 
changes that respect women.130 
 
Evaluation 
Ultimately, there are few concrete programs to evaluate on this criterion.  The most 
significant – training – has faced significant setbacks.  However, the overall culture of the 
mission, as will be clear from the activities listed in the following categories (post-conflict 
reconstruction, DDR, and preventing gender based violence), is one that places mainstreaming as 
a high priority in decision-making.  Furthermore, the external network of the gender unit and the 
seeds it has planted in local organizations is an important resource, though often overlooked 
because it is outside the scope of the mission mandate.  Thus, on this criterion MINUSTAH 
succeeds at making adequate efforts towards mainstreaming. 
4.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTURCTION 
Description 
For this criterion, MINUSTAH conducted mainstreaming in the electoral process, 
governance, the justice system, and development.  Of all these areas, MINUSTAH’s most 
serious investment in mainstreaming has been in the political and governmental realm. 
MINUSTAH’s support to Haiti’s police force and for human rights of prisoners has been 
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minimal.  Desperately needed development programs have been neglected by MINUSTAH in 
favor of programs run by other UN agencies and NGOs.  Regardless, mainstreaming has been 
considered in most of these areas. 
For the legislative and local elections in 2006 and 2007, MINUSTAH and the gender unit 
were heavily involved in the electoral process and developing women for political careers.  On a 
policy level, MINUSTAH influenced the elections code to better include women.  In support of 
recommendations from local women’s organizations, MINUSTAH supported a recommendation 
to offer a 2/3 reduction in the fee to register a candidate for any party that had at least 30% 
female candidates.131  This recommendation was accepted and implemented by the Provisional 
Electoral Council.  Additionally, MINUSTAH held discussions, albeit unsuccessfully, with the 
Electoral Council about quotas for women in elected offices.132 
On a grassroots level, MINUSTAH held a five-day training session on “women in 
leadership” to promote women’s involvement as candidates.133  Additionally, two intensive 
weeklong courses covered topics like peaceful conflict resolution; communication; planning; 
project development and implementation; public speaking techniques; and current events.  
Following these trainings, the participants formed a support network called “The Network of 
Women Candidates to Win” supported by MINUSTAH and run through Fanm Yo La.134  In 
addition to trainings, MINUSTAH attempted to raise awareness of female candidates and voters 
through a weekly radio program.135 
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Despite MINUSTAH’s efforts to support women candidates, the results of the elections 
were not particularly impressive.  While women’s participation as voters and candidates was 
higher than ever – 48.59% of the electorate was female – results do not reflect this 
accomplishment.136  In national elections, 4 of 30 (13.3%) elected senate members were women 
and 4 of 99 (4%) deputies.  Locally, 25 of 420 (5.9%) elected mayors were women, an 
improvement from the six women mayors elected in 2000.137  While improving, these 
proportions make clear that women still have a much greater role to play in Haiti’s government.  
A session from before the elections in 2005 identified the following barriers to women’s 
participation:  women are afraid of violence, they lack funding to carry out electoral campaigns, 
they have responsibilities as a woman head of a household, they lack policy incentives, and they 
lack training.138 
Fortunately, MINUSTAH is working to break down these barriers by continuing efforts 
after the elections to increase women’s participation in the political process.  MINUSTAH has 
helped to create a Gender Working Group on the Promotion of Women’s Political Rights.139  
Additionally, MINUSTAH continued its pre-election trainings with Fanm Yo La for female 
candidates.  The second phase of the training program offered ongoing mentoring for successful 
women candidates or women who wished to maintain their political careers.  The women 
participated in individual coaching sessions and were required to implement community projects.  
The goals of this program were to continue building capacity for women to address the gender 
                                                 
136 1-13 
137 1-13 
138 39-N/A 
139 121-10 
 61 
disparity in elected positions and to develop bonds between elected women, their constituents, 
and local women’s organizations.140 
In the justice system, MINUSTAH’s main work was developing and training the HNP.  
HNP officers have had joint trainings with UN Civilian Police on gender mainstreaming issues.  
Additionally, the HNP established a gender focal point network throughout the force whose 
members also receive training from MINUSTAH trainers.  To plan for future projects within the 
HNP, a needs assessment was conducted in 2004 by female UN civilian police officers.141  In 
2005, MINUSTAH piloted a program that improved police station facilities specifically for 
women victims of violence.142  In terms of gender balance within the HNP, male-to-female ratios 
are slowly improving.  Currently, approximately 10% of the HNP is women and the percent of 
women in each graduating class is slowly increasing over time [See Figure 4-1]. 
Figure 4-1: Percentage of Women in HNP by graduating class 
Graduating class # and date Class size # of 
women 
% women 
20th class, began July Aug. 2008 700 84 12 
19th class, begin Jan. 2007 600 30 5% 
18th class, began July 2006 578 27 5% 
17th class, graduated Sept. 2005 778 35 4.5% 
16th class, ongoing May 2005 368 15 4% 
15th class, graduated Jan. 2005 200 15 7.5% 
Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General 
In other parts of the justice system, improvement in gender balance is needed.  Of the 700 
magistrates, 45 (6.4%) of them are women and two of the 25 (8%) Justices of the Peace are 
women.  Gender parity in all aspects of the justice system has been strongly advocated by 
MINUSTAH’s gender affairs unit. 
                                                 
140 For details about the participants, their projects, and personal testimony, see 1 
141 83-5 
142 95-7 
 62 
Another aspect of the justice system MINUSTAH is involved in is human rights of 
prisoners, especially female prisoners.  MINUSTAH has provided human rights officers at police 
stations and detention centers to give special attention to female detainees.  In 2008, 
approximately 325 of the 7,530 inmates nationwide were women.143  Unfortunately, despite 
MINUSTAH’s attention, there are still cases of ill treatment women receive in Haitian prisons.  
In 2005, an investigation by a coalition of North American peace and justice organizations called 
“Let Haiti Live” uncovered women being unconstitutionally held for longer than 48 hours 
without seeing a judge and refused access to judges because they were unable to afford a lawyer.  
Some women had been abused, beaten, or raped while in custody. 144  Other women had children 
who were abandoned as a result of their arrest because they were a head of household or their 
husband was arrested with them.145  As a small condolence, MINUSTAH reported in 2007 that 
they successfully lobbied for the release of 150 individuals, including pregnant women and 
minors, illegally held in pretrial detention.146  Regardless, a more systematic approach to this 
issue is needed. 
 In terms of development projects, MINUSTAH has not reported any projects specifically 
targeted at women.  Some healthcare programs include women, although they are coordinated 
through UNFPA and are only tangential to MINUSTAH.  In one instance, MINUSTAH troops 
directly provided medical consultations and medicine to the local population, which included 
care for women.  However, detailed information on MINUSTAH QIPs is not available. 
 
 
                                                 
143 116-9 
144 8-6 
145 8-6 
146 110-11 
 63 
Evaluation 
On this criterion, MINSTAH’s record is inconsistent, but on the whole it is adequate.  
MINUSTAH has had many shining programs in the realm of women’s political participation, 
both in gaining helpful policies and in training women to participate.  However, women’s actual 
success in elections was unimpressive.  In the security sector, the gender balance in the HNP is 
very progressive compared to some other forces and the gender focal point network is a valuable 
asset.  Unfortunately, this network and the trainings for the HNP have not been particularly 
successful.147  Furthermore, the lack of development programs for women is troubling.  
However, MINUSTAH’s overall efforts on this criterion were adequate. 
4.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION 
Description 
MINUSTAH’s DDR program is unique among UN DDR programs for several reasons.  
First, Haiti has many armed gangs with no clear political agendas.  The rebel factions are not 
simply pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide, but urban gangs that coexist with civilian communities.  
Second, Haiti’s gun control laws allow individuals to possess a personal weapon to defend one’s 
self and one’s home.  Therefore, total disarmament of the civilian populations is not possible.  
Third, the DDR program was not begun until 2006 in order for MINUSTAH to focus on other 
priorities such as the elections and developing the police force.   
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To address these anomalies, Security Council Resolution 1702 (2006) authorized 
MINUSTAH to create a Comprehensive Community Violence Reduction Plan.  This 
mainstreamed plan acknowledged women’s role as perpetrators and victims of violence and 
provided opportunities for women to participate in the DDR program.148  Women are 
participants in elected bodies that make up the DDR program.  The first type of local body is the 
Community Development Committees (CDCs) which require women participants.  The second, 
Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (CVPDs), are elected from the 
members of the CDCs.  These bodies analyze conflict in their communities and identify activities 
to reduce conflict.  Once the community violence reduction program was organized, women 
were accepted as armed combatants at Reinsertion Orientation Centers (ROCs) and provided 
with separate and secure facilities.  Women then received reintegration benefits for themselves 
and beneficiaries in their immediate family.  Specifically, reintegration services include 
vocational training and job placement or business management training.  At the end of 2008, the 
DDR program was scheduled to begin providing skills training to 1,000 participants, 300 of 
whom were women, and three months of vocational training to 1,200 participants, 400 of whom 
were w
focus on rebuilding the entire community structure, allow communities to identify and manage 
                                                
omen.149 
As a result of the mainstreamed DDR program, MINUSTAH’s gender unit conducted a 
study which led to a greater understanding of women’s experiences and stigmas they 
encountered as armed combatants, rape perpetrators, and rape victims.  The study made 
recommendations to the DDR program to address these issues.  The recommendations were: 
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threats against women, and include women in community-based projects like the CPVD instead 
of the traditional DDR program.150 
 
Evaluation 
Some information missing in this criterion is the number of participants, especially 
gender disaggregated numbers.  Thus, assessing the program is a challenge.  However, the 
creation of quotas for women in the community-based planning committees and the availability 
of the program to women all show efforts in mainstreaming.  Other gender sensitive DDR 
programs have not included women in key planning stages as substantively as MINUSTAH has.  
Finally, conducting a study to evaluate the gender sensitivity of the program is particularly 
laudable.  Thus, MINUSTAH has made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming in this criterion. 
4.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
Description 
In this criterion, MINUSTAH struggles to implement adequate programs.  To define the 
GBV problem in Haiti, a 2008 report of the Secretary General stated that physical domestic 
violence is the most commonly reported form of violence against women, followed by sexual 
violence.151  Statistics from 2004 and 2005 show an increase in the number of women and girl 
victims of violence received by NGOs and law enforcement.152  In addition to violence against 
women, several sources indicate that child rape is a problem with over 50% of rapes (and by one 
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account 72% of rapes) involving minors.  Some of the conditions which allow for such high rates 
of GBV are tolerance of the HNP and lack of government investigation into cases committed by 
the HNP.  As a 2006 Amnesty International report observes, “abuses committed by HNP 
officials were committed with impunity.  Investigations into most police violations, when 
conducted, did not meet international standards.  Prosecutions and convictions for human rights 
violations were non-existent.”153  Additionally, women do not report GBV crimes due to low 
confidence in the justice system and fear of retribution.154 
MINUSTAH has made small efforts to deal with the problems of violence against 
women.  In February 2005, MINUSTAH participated in a workshop to define a national strategy 
on violence against women.  Owing to the high rate of child rape, MINUSTAH partnered with 
the Haitian Coalition for Child Rights to run an awareness campaign that included issues of 
sexual abuse and child prostitution.  The gender unit has collaborated on the 2005 National Plan 
of Action to combat violence against women.  This plan promotes more efficient data collection, 
increasing support services for victims, and cooperation between women’s organizations, NGOs, 
and the government.155  MINUSTAH is also a member of the National Coordination Committee 
on the Prevention of Violence Against Women.  Unfortunately, the work or accomplishments of 
many of these organizations are not available.  Other documented efforts MINUSTAH has made 
to prevent and respond to these crimes are: establishing a database to collect statistics on 
Violence Against Women, training the members of the HNP, and disseminating information 
through the HNP on women’s rights and the crimes of rape and domestic violence in schools. 
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Evaluation 
Considering the scope of the problem posed by GBV, MINUSTAH has not made 
adequate efforts on this criterion.  Holding workshops and collecting statistics can not be 
effective unless followed through with appropriate legal, enforcement, and service program 
changes.  In Haiti, this has not been the case.  MINUSTAH has been wrapped up in bureaucratic 
solutions with no results.  Instead, reports of GBV have increased following MINUSTAH’s 
presence in the country and the mission has hardly begun to acknowledge the problem. 
4.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT 
Description 
Data on MINUSTAH’s deployment is scattered and only began being reported regularly 
within the past year.  The numbers that do exist, displayed in Figure 4-2, are not extensive 
enough to determine any trends.  However, they certainly do not reflect mainstreaming efforts as 
none of the figures approach gender parity in either the military or the civilian police division.   
Figure 4-2: MINUSTAH military and civilian police deployment 
Police Deployment, by date Total 
Deployed
# of Women % Women 
August 2008 874 52 6% 
March 2008 894 45 5% 
October 2004 409 15 4% 
August 2004 240 5 2% 
Military Deployment, by date    
August 2008 6825 127 2% 
March 2008 6938 127 2% 
October 2004 3092 34 1% 
Civilian Staff, by date    
October 2004 667 105 16% 
Note: Figures from Reports of the Secretary General and Puechguirbal? 
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The data assembled by the DPKO on military personnel is available in Appendix C.  
Similar to the table above, women have made up just fewer than 2% of military personnel.  
There have been few increases in the number of women deployed over time, again reflecting few 
mainstreaming efforts. 
Nadine Puchguirbal, the senior gender advisor, acknowledged this problem in an 
interview, stating, “these figures do not reflect the requirement of expanding the role and 
contribution of women in peacekeeping operations as stipulated in Resolution 1325 (2000).”156  
Women in leadership are similarly non-existent.  In addition to the gender advisor, one woman is 
the head of MINUSTAH’s political component, but other members of the mission’s leadership 
are male. 
 
Evaluation 
From these figures, it is clear MINUSTAH has made no efforts on this criterion.  The 
problem is acknowledged by the gender advisor, but no additional programs have been 
implemented.  Furthermore, this lack of effort has likely had a negative impact on other criteria. 
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4.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN 
PERSONNEL 
Description 
In this criterion, reports of SEA are not nearly as extreme as in other missions.  On the 
contrary, there have been no reports of GBV by UN personnel.  Lack of allegations has meant 
that reports of the Secretary General do not keep running tallies as in other missions or mention 
the conduct issue at all.  Unfortunately, an absence of reported incidents has not comforted the 
Haitian population.  A 2005 report of Refugees International reports just the opposite.  In the 
report, a Haitian woman is quoted saying, “the [civilian police] who patrol our neighborhood 
don’t do anything.  They are only interested in talking to women.  These women are not 
prostitutes who talk to them but they are hungry.  They will sell their bodies for money.”157  A 
Haitian man observes, “we’ve seen an increase in prostitution since MINUSTAH came.  In 1994, 
we had a lot of problems with the Multinational Forces.  The [peacekeepers] bring their bad 
habits with them to Haiti, but they do not bring change.”158  Furthermore, international media 
have covered incidents of UN peacekeepers from MINUSTAH being repatriated for SEA-related 
violations.159 
It is extremely troublesome that the NGO, local population, and international media are 
well aware of the issues, and yet reports of incidents are non-existent in UN documents.  One 
partial explanation for the lack of reporting is that despite the creation of a Code of Conduct 
Officer to receive reports of abuse by peacekeepers, the position is vacant.  Currently, the senior 
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gender advisor has taken on the role in addition to her other responsibilities.160  This is not an 
excuse to avoid addressing and reporting on this problem. 
MINUSTAH addresses the issue of SEA by peacekeepers through the application of the 
basic prevention formula.  The zero-tolerance policy is explained and enforced through training 
provided to all categories of mission personnel and all new staff.  There was a training for 
managers on a 2008 Bulletin of the Secretary-General about the prohibition of discrimination, 
harassment, including sexual harassment, and abuse of authority.161  The gender unit has 
conducted awareness campaigns for MINUSTAH personnel and the Haitian public. In 2005, 
posters raising awareness were hung in all mission offices.162 
 
Evaluation 
In this criterion, MINUSTAH has not made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming.  If 
there were no instances of SEA, then the mission should be celebrating.  However, it is clear 
from international media reports and local perceptions that there is nothing to celebrate.  Thus, 
the mission must develop a better program for prevention and work to provide transparent 
reporting on the conduct and discipline of its personnel. 
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4.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING 
Description 
MINUSTAH’s reports on gender mainstreaming are inconsistent and of poor quality.  In 
reports of the Secretary General, sections on gender or discussion of gender issues in any section 
are included occasionally, but with no clear pattern or trend.  Furthermore, even in instances 
where gender is mentioned, the reports rarely provide significant information or details on 
programs.  Ironically, MINUSTAH press releases included women and the activities of the 
gender unit more frequently during the first year of the mission which since have disappeared.  
Currently, press releases and reports mention women only in passing or as a part of “vulnerable 
groups”.  Even the mission mandate mentioned attention to “vulnerable groups” like women.163 
 
Evaluation 
Clearly, with such little reporting that exists, MINUSTAH has made inadequate efforts in 
this criterion.  Some evaluation documents do exist, such as the gender unit’s assessment of the 
DDR program and an HIV/AIDS knowledge report of the peacekeeping best practices unit.  
However, substantial and integrated reporting is lacking, especially in reports of the Secretary 
General.  Furthermore, data on DDR participants, gender balance, and GBV by peacekeepers is 
missing. 
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4.8 SUMMARY 
Peacekeeping Operation     Adequate  
Post-Conflict Reconstruction     Adequate 
DDR        Adequate 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Inadequate 
Gender Balance      None 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Inadequate 
 by UN personnel 
Monitoring and Reporting     Inadequate 
 
MINUSTAH is another peacekeeping operation with mixed success.  The mission’s most 
impressive program was its re-tooled DDR program (“comprehensive community violence 
reduction plan”) which was participatory and included women at all stages. Allowing a local 
community, including the women of the community, to identify its own threats is empowering 
and effective.  The gender unit was integrally involved in planning and implementing the 
program, especially through the initial gender trainings for all mission staff.  This demonstrates 
an effective culture of gender sensitivity and mainstreaming. 
In some ways, MINUSTAH can be seen as a post-GBV mission.  During the initial 
implementation of Resolution 1325 and mainstreaming, peacekeeping missions simply invested 
resources into GBV and SEA issues in order to satisfy mainstreaming guidelines.  Having a 
gender advisor formerly from MONUC (where GBV and SEA are major problems in civil 
society and by UN personnel), this type of approach seemed even more likely.  Unfortunately, 
while caution about the over-emphasis on SEA and GBV is important, MINUSTAH seems to 
have fallen to the other extreme of lacking attention to these issues.  While documentation of UN 
personnel engaging in acts of GBV/SEA is lacking, there is clear evidence that members of the 
HNP are committing these crimes.  This makes a strong case both for better monitoring and 
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reporting as well as greater attention to the SEA/GBV issue as a whole.  As mentioned before, 
both of these issues will be discussed more in Chapter 6. 
One final note about the results of poverty combined with the lack of development 
projects.  Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere and over half of the population 
lives on less than $1/day.164  With this extreme poverty, it is incredible that MINUSTAH has not 
done more to address development and economic needs.  This again shows that peacekeeping 
operations need to better coordinate with economic agencies.  Additionally, the poverty of local 
women feeds into the problem of SEA, with incentives to engage in prostitution in exchange for 
monetary or resource benefits. 
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5.0  UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE (UNMIT) 
Timor-Leste’s national history is an exceptional story of colonization and independence.  
As the first independent nation of the 21st century, East Timor is also a first for the UN in the 
realm of “nation building.”  Although there is no authoritative definition of this term, “nation 
building” differs from peacekeeping in that the United Nations is more integrally involved in the 
governance of the country during its transition from an unstable state (or in Timor-Leste’s case a 
non-existent state) to stability and self-sufficiency.  Just as in other missions, mainstreaming 
efforts are a part of the UN mission in Timor-Leste.  However, because UN personnel have a 
thorough understanding of Timor-Leste’s institutional structures, mainstreaming is extremely 
integrated between the mission and the government in many program areas. 
 
History165 
The UN’s involvement in Timor-Leste began in 1999 with a political operation whose 
mission was to determine whether the people of Timor-Leste would accept Indonesia’s offer of 
special autonomy or whether they desired independence.  After the country voted 
overwhelmingly for independence, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) ran the country’s administration during the transition from October 1999 until 
Timor-Leste became fully independent in May 2002. 
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Post-independence, the UN remained involved in Timor-Leste with a three-year 
peacekeeping mission and a third year-long political mission.  Although mandated to end in May 
of 2006, political, humanitarian, and security crises broke out early that year.  The crises were a 
result of different experiences of the population during the years of occupation and 
independence, a single dominant party in the government, excessive executive power, and 
poverty.  In response to the crises, the government of East Timor requested another peacekeeping 
mission.  In August 2006, UNMIT was created by UN resolution 1704 (2006). 
Because of the UN’s deep understanding of the political, social, and economic issues in 
the country, the mandate of UNMIT was particularly detailed.  The mission’s tasks were similar 
to many of those in the preceding case studies: providing public security with UN police and 
support and training for the Timorese National Police (PNTL), building capacity in government 
institutions like the justice sector, monitoring, promoting, and protecting human rights (including 
for women), assisting with aid programs (focusing vulnerable groups like women and children), 
and assisting with the 2007 elections.  Fortunately, the mention of vulnerable groups here is not 
dismissive as the mandate goes on to include an entire plank devoted to gender mainstreaming: 
“to mainstream gender perspectives and those of children and youth throughout the Mission’s 
policies, programs and activities, and, working together with United Nations agencies, funds and 
programs, support the development of a national strategy to promote gender equality and 
empowerment of women.”166 
 
Women in Timor-Leste 
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Prior to UNMIT, the situation of women varied depending on the governing power of the 
time.  While under Indonesian authority, a 1999 journal indicated “[the women of East Timor] 
have been raped in the presence of family members, forced to marry Indonesian soldiers, 
subjected to torture by electric shock, sexually abused, and forcibly sterilized.”167  East-Timorese 
women throughout their colonial history and persisting today are predominantly “illiterate, 
uneducated subsistence farmers.”168  Regardless, women have been organizing since the 
beginning of dialogues and peace negotiations in the 1990s.  Women worked with UN missions, 
such as when UNTAET was creating the government structure and women advocated for a 
gender section.169  UNTAET also conducted many mainstreaming efforts with regard to 
elections and women’s leadership training.170  After the 2001 elections, the new government 
accomplished many of the reforms women had lobbied for.  The government created an Office 
for the Promotion of Equality in the office of the prime minister.  To bring the country in line 
with international law, Timor-Leste signed and ratified CEDAW in 2003.  Thus, by the time 
UNMIT began, women in Timor-Leste were familiar with the UN’s mainstreaming policy and 
already had some successes in policies and programs.  However, progress by other missions does 
not negate the need for UNMIT to include mainstreaming efforts.  Thus, below is an analysis of 
UNMIT on each of the seven criteria.171 
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5.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Description 
From the planning stages of UNMIT, the Secretary General discussed the need for a 
Senior Gender Advisor and a Conduct and Discipline Unit to deal with instances of SEA.172  A 
gender unit was created at the beginning of 2006 with Rita Reddy as the senior gender advisor.  
In addition to the gender unit, UNMIT has three other gender advisors in the Administration of 
Justice unit, the Serious Crime Investigation unit, and the HIV/AIDS Unit.173  The integration of 
gender advisors into additional units demonstrates a very systematic approach to mainstreaming 
within UNMIT.  As a result, gender perspectives in developing other programs are easily 
accessible and the gender advisors have expertise in both an individual program and gender 
issues.  The implications of this cannot be understated. 
As in other missions, a large part of the gender unit’s work is training on gender 
sensitivity.  Gender mainstreaming induction courses occur twice monthly and for all new 
staff.174  These courses ensure that decision-makers take gender into account and that all 
programs and policies of UNMIT reflect gender sensitivity.  In addition to training, the gender 
unit also works closely with local women’s groups and members of Parliament on policy 
development.175  The unit coordinated workshops and roundtables on issues such as gender-
based violence for NGOs, the government, and other UN agencies.  In 2007, a day-long 
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workshop focused on the referral process for domestic violence and sexual assault.  Participants 
discussed the origins of the GBV problem, the need for awareness, training, and capacity-
building, increased access to services in the rural districts, and better coordination between the 
government and NGOs.176  Another 10 day training educated legal and medical personnel who 
deal with victims of GBV.177 
Other external mainstreaming activities the gender unit has run include many programs in 
partnership with civil society groups advocating on gender issues.  To celebrate International 
Women’s Day 2008, UNMIT held events, such as films on domestic violence, community 
debates, sports, and cultural activities.178  Near the end of 2007, the gender unit supported an 
annual “16 Days Campaign Against Violence” that consisted of workshops, seminars, TV debates, 
radio broadcasts, peaceful marches, music, and theatre and dance performances.179 One partnering 
local group in this campaign was the Association of Men Against Violence, a network of 
prominent men in government, church, and community leadership positions which is working to 
redefine masculinity in Timorese culture.  The group also has a peer mentoring and support 
program for group members to discuss violence against women.  Some grassroots techniques 
used by the group include community education programs on public buses and at communal 
gatherings.  The organization has partnered with the gender affairs unit to lobby the government 
on policy issues such as the draft law on domestic violence.180 
A final note is warranted on the source of much of the information in this section.  
Surprisingly, reports of the gender unit itself provide detailed accounts of the unit’s activities.  
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Unlike some of the other missions that may have one or two irregular reports covering large time 
spans, UNMIT’s gender affairs unit has produced extensive Quarterly Reports since 2007.  
These indicate that the operation is coordinated both internally and externally and has a vast 
network of supporting individuals and groups. 
 
Evaluation 
UNMIT’s systematic approach to relationships and programs constitutes adequate efforts 
towards mainstreaming.  The obvious commitment in number of gender advisors, organization of 
gender advisors, and programs for women demonstrates that this mission has a fully integrated 
policy of mainstreaming.  The unit has many internal and external partners and has conducted 
important work to coordinate these groups’ activities.  Thus, UNMIT has made adequate efforts 
towards mainstreaming in this criterion. 
5.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTURCTION 
Description 
The majority of UNMIT’s activities fall under this criterion because reconstruction is 
nearly synonymous with nation building.  UNMIT has made mainstreaming efforts in the 
elections, the government, the justice system, and development programs.  The 2007 elections 
were only Timor-Leste’s second round of elections since independence.  Ensuring that these 
elections were peaceful and incorporated women was part of UNMIT’s mandate.  To fulfill this 
mandate, UNMIT held a workshop series in April of 2006 aimed at preparing women for 
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elections.181  Voter education efforts targeted at women continued throughout 2006.182  In early 
2007, UNMIT supported the appointment of members to the National Commission on Elections, 
of which one-third (5/15) are women.183  In terms of elections policy, UNMIT lobbied for 
elections laws and party procedures that supported women’s participation.  Out of 16 parties, 12 
signed a pact to participate in and advance a platform of women’s issues.  The platform included 
two affirmative action clauses: 1) there must be at least one woman in every group of four party 
members and 2) any substitution of a woman in a party role must be for another woman.  Two 
parties went beyond these standards with one party headed by a woman and one of the eight 
parties with presidential candidates supporting a woman. 
Elections were held in April and June of 2007 and turnout for women was significant; 47 
to 48% of women voted; an excellent figure considering the total turnout of 80 to 82%.184  One 
remarkable policy impacting turnout gave pregnant women and women with infants (along with 
the sick and elderly) priority in voting lines.  This expedited women’s voting time and prevented 
the inconveniences of voting from outweighing women’s participation in the process.  Some 
other reasons the gender affairs unit cited for high turnout amongst women were “voter 
education, civic education, and positive attitude of election management bodies.”185 
The high turn-out among women was evident in the election results; 18 out of 246 
women candidates were elected to the 65-member Parliament, bringing them to 28% of the body.  
While this is still not equal representation, it is a greater percentage than many developed nations 
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in 2007.186  In the executive branch, women also hold significant positions.  Three of ten 
ministers (Finance, Justice, and Solidarity) are women.187  Furthermore, women accounted for a 
quarter of all civil service jobs as of 2006.188  Unfortunately, these roles are rarely leadership 
positions or areas which allow women to develop gender-sensitive policies within their 
departments.  Instead, gender mainstreaming policies are siphoned into a few institutional havens 
for gender policy: 1) the Secretariat of State for the Promotion of Equality, an office under the 
Prime Minister, and 2) gender focal points in each government ministry.  Four ministries 
(Education, Health, Justice, and Agriculture) are a part of a pilot program for additional gender 
mainstreaming support.189  These institutional supports for mainstreaming are vestiges of 
mainstreaming policies created by previous UN missions and supported by UNMIT. 
Following the elections, UNMIT remained involved in Parliament and civil society to 
ensure that newly-elected women are effective in their offices and that more women have 
opportunities to serve in the future.  In Timor-Leste’s districts, UNMIT held a series of dialogues 
for 727 individuals to connect women leaders to others in their community.190  In another 
training session, community leaders learned the role of women in village councils and the role of 
these councils and village chiefs in preventing domestic violence.191  In 2008, UNMIT held a 
series of workshops on Timor-Leste’s Constitution for representatives of women’s organizations 
in village councils.192 
For women in Parliament, UNMIT assisted with a National Parliamentary Women’s 
Caucus that met to define priorities on women’s empowerment and equality and has begun to 
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develop a five-year plan on mainstreaming.  Additionally, a gender resource center in Parliament 
substantively supports the women members to advance women’s issues on the national agenda.  
One example of the role of this center is a training on gender-sensitive budgeting which was held 
for the women Parliament members.193  UNMIT also supported sending three women members 
of Parliament to participate in the Asian-Pacific Women Parliamentarians and Ministers 
Conference.194 
Related to this work, UNMIT and the gender unit have advanced a few policy measures 
in Parliament and the national government.  Specifically, they have worked on a gender equality 
act, revisions to the National Development Plan, and revisions to the penal code, including a 
draft domestic violence law.  To support the domestic violence law, the gender unit convened 
workshops and roundtables with participants from local women’s groups, international NGOs, 
the government, the legal system, relevant civil society groups, and other UN agencies.  In 
addition to this law, UNMIT advocated for the Gender Land Law.  This proposal would allow 
women to inherit property by creating joint titles between husbands and wives.  UNMIT has 
convened a working group of government officials, UN officials, and NGO workers on the 
issue.195  In the realm of development policy, UNMIT supported a dialogue and an extraordinary 
session of Parliament to discuss investments in women and girls that would promote equality and 
empowerment. 
UNMIT’s policy and training expertise was also applied in the justice sector.  Timor-
Leste’s justice system had significant problems disproportionately affecting women seeking 
justice.  A lack of courthouse security, including security assistance to witnesses or victims, 
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compromised women’s ability to participate in the legal system.196  Beyond security issues, the 
entire justice system lacked training and capacity to address gender issues.  In response to these 
needs, UNMIT created a support system of gender officers.  UNMIT provided trainings for all 
segments of the justice system from judges, prosecutors, and defenders, to community police, 
PNTL, the Crime Prevention Unit, and the Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU).  UNMIT trainings 
for PNTL on human rights, including gender issues, are ongoing.197 
The PNTL also had several successes including the creation of the VPU which receive 
resources donated by UNMIT.198  This unit exists in all districts, is staffed by female police 
officers, and handles cases of gender-based violence.  The national and district VPUs coordinate 
work support each other.  A second success of the PNTL is the compilation and distribution of a 
gender sensitive police handbook for use by PNTL personnel.199  PNTL also actively recruits 
women for the force.  These numbers are reflected in Figure 5-1. 
Figure 5-1: PNTL recruitment and certification 
Date Provisionally Certified Fully Certified 
Total # Women % Women Total # Women % Women 
Jul 2008 3114 570 18% 599 126 21% 
Jan 2008 1503 271 18% 186 42 22.5% 
Aug 2007 981 168 17%    
Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General  
Although parity has not been reached, the force is growing.  At the very least, the women who 
are in the force have specific roles in the VPUs. 
 In the area of development assistance, UNMIT helped to steer $5.9 million in 
international aid from the Millennium Development Goals to Timor-Leste over three years.  This 
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money is specifically targeted for projects involving gender equality and women’s human rights 
programs.  However, UNMIT has not funded QIPS or development projects.   
 
Evaluation 
UNMIT has made adequate efforts on this criterion.  Supporting women in leadership and 
government both before and after the elections was a major achievement.  The elections policy 
proposals for women’s equality within political parties were a significant accomplishment.  
UNMIT also worked to influence policy on GBV and women’s equality.  For the police and 
justice system, UNMIT has provided extensive trainings and is working to support women’s 
needs in the justice system. 
5.3 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
Description 
This criterion unfortunately is again a part of the mission’s activities.  The first study on 
GBV in Timor-Leste in 2002 indicated that “almost half the respondents reported at least one 
incident of “violence” from their partners in the previous year.”200  When UNMIT began in 
August of 2006, GBV was the most frequently reported crime nationwide.  In August of 2007, 
reports of GBV temporarily decreased, but rose again in early 2008 [see Figure 5-2].  
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Figure 5-2: Reports of Rape and Domestic Violence, by date 
Date Rape 
Reports 
Domestic Violence 
Reports 
GBV Cases 
February 2008   46 
January 2008   41 
Jan.-Dec. 2007 26 207  
February 2007   11 
January 2007   11 
Note: All figures from UNMIT Gender Affairs Quarterly Reports 
UNMIT justifies the increase as follows: 
This could be explained by a number of factors including an increased confidence 
in the police resulting in more reporting than last year, and a change in the 
classification of gender based violence cases by UNPOL in 2008. UNPOL have 
renamed rape offences as sexual offences, and instead of domestic violence, they 
have created two new categories of assault/domestic and dispute/domestic to 
provide a better understanding of the nature of cases and to better document the 
different complaints. Using different classifications this year means that it is 
possible many domestic disputes in 2007 were not documented as domestic 
violence or gender based violence accounts.201 
 
In addition to the absolute number of GBV incidents, the problem is compounded by a backlog 
of cases and the inability of the justice system to handle cases in a time-efficient manner.  As of 
July 2008, one-third of the 4,700 backlogged criminal cases involved GBV.202  Because of this 
delay, many women resolve their cases through traditional justice mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms are used due to the lack of a domestic violence law and a perception that the VPUs 
lack capacity to deal with these cases.  However, the traditional justice systems are devoid of a 
legal basis and the cases they hear are rarely brought to the attention of police, preventing a true 
understanding of the problems of GBV.203 
UNMIT has provided many resources to address GBV.  The gender affairs unit is 
working to develop a draft law on domestic violence and lobby for its approval, as mentioned in 
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section 5.2.  UNMIT helped the Ministry of Labor and Community Relations and the Ministry of 
Health to develop responses to GBV.  Two districts are piloting accelerated GBV response 
activities.204  Furthermore, UNMIT provided 15 trained peer educators on GBV, eight of whom 
are women.205  UNMIT is also translating a training manual on domestic violence and 
developing a medical protocol for victims of domestic violence or sexual abuse.206  Finally, 
UNMIT held a train the trainer pilot program for GBV investigations which effectively 
addressed concepts about which previous working groups had revealed confusion.207 
 One initiative which began locally but is now supported by UNMIT is a referral program 
for victims of GBV.  Although the program’s main efforts are currently concentrated in Dili, 
UNMIT is working to expand the program into the districts by strengthening relationships with 
NGOs, organizing awareness-raising, and conducting a baseline study on GBV in two of the 
boarder districts.208  UNMIT has also held a series of ten trainings for 249 participants in civil 
society on different aspects of the referral network.  A separate training was held for individuals 
who are part of the legal or medical aspects of the referral network to help them develop their 
skills and better coordinate with each other.209  These trainees can now address the lack of trials 
and prosecutions for cases that go through the referral program.  UNMIT also works to 
disseminate legal information about GBV during public meetings on justice issues.   
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Evaluation 
With these numerous efforts, UNMIT has again made adequate efforts towards 
mainstreaming.  By reporting on statistics and tracking cases of GBV, UNMIT demonstrates its 
awareness of this issue.  Lobbying for legal changes to domestic violence law is an important 
next step on this issue.  Additionally trainings and provisions of expertise to the justice system is 
an effective way to support addressing these issues.  Finally, the victim referral network is an 
innovative strategy to deal with the entirety of the GBV issue. 
5.4 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT 
Unfortunately, in terms of gender balance, UNMIT is no different than any other 
peacekeeping operation.  As shown in Figure 5-3, women make up just over a third of 
international staff, but the percentages of military and police officers are dismal.  Appendix D 
displays the military personnel data going back to August of 2006.  These numbers also show a 
fluctuation between zero and two women personnel, resulting in higher percentage fluctuations 
than other missions, because of the low number of total military personnel. 
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Figure 5-3: Gender Balance in UNMIT personnel 
Military Personnel, by date Total Number # of Women % Women 
July 2008 33 0 0% 
January 2008 33 0 0% 
August 2007 34 1 3% 
February 2007 33 1 3% 
Police Officers, by date    
July 2008 1542 76 5% 
January 2008 1480 77 5% 
August 2007 1635 94 6% 
February 2007 1313 79 6% 
Civilian Staff, by date    
July 2008 1165 264 23% 
January 2008 1147 258 22.5% 
August 2007 1145 253 22% 
February 2007 538 116 21.5% 
Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General  
UNMIT has expressed a need for more UNMIT officers with training and experience in gender-
based crimes and a need to train all UNMIT police as well as PNTL in women’s needs, 
investigative techniques, and women’s access to judicial recourse.  These needs have not been 
met nor supplemented by additional recruitment of female personnel.  Furthermore, there are no 
women in the mission’s top leadership.  Fortunately, the four gender advisors that UNMIT has 
are working successfully, as demonstrated above, to mainstream gender perspectives despite the 
gender imbalance in staff.   
 
Evaluation 
Regardless of gender advisors or other mainstreaming successes, on this criterion 
UNMIT has made no efforts to achieve gender balance.  While this failure has not yet caused 
havoc in other areas, it is a troubling blemish on UNMIT’s overall record.  The lack of women in 
leadership is particularly troubling.  While their role is supplanted by gender advisors, there is 
still a need for additional women in all aspects of this mission. 
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5.5 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN 
PERSONNEL 
Description 
Examining UNMIT’s efforts in this criterion is a challenge.  On one hand, GBV by UN 
personnel is not an endemic problem in this mission the way it has been in the other cases 
analyzed in this paper.  Certainly this is a positive fact.  At the same time, the strikingly low 
numbers have also prevented UNMIT from making any true efforts in this criterion.  
Unfortunately, the only two data points available on this criterion overlap are too dissimilar to 
allow any inference of trends over time.  Between August 2006 and February 2007, 10 rape cases 
and 2 sexual assault of minors cases were reported.210  Between January and August 2007, only 
8 allegations of SEA were reported.211  Furthermore, the fact that data is not reported more 
frequently is worrisome; it prevents due diligence on the issue. Even more frightening is the 
knowledge that other missions have existed with problems of GBV by peacekeepers for a short 
period under the radar before exploding publically and tarnishing the UN’s reputation.  The only 
efforts UNMIT does state it has taken are a blanket commitment to the zero-tolerance policy and 
training.  All new staff members listen to presentations on gender awareness and mainstreaming 
and SEA training by the Conduct and Discipline Unit as part of their induction training.   
 
Evaluation 
While without more data, it is difficult to asses UNMIT on this criterion, their efforts are 
considerably inadequate.  This very lack of data is the main cause of the inadequate score here.  
                                                 
210 112-10 
211 111-10 
 90 
In other missions, it is clear that the zero-tolerance policy and training have not deterred issues of 
SEA.  Thus, it remains to be seen whether these measures are effective to prevent issues in 
Timor-Leste.  However, a more proactive policy would be required for adequate efforts on this 
criterion. 
5.6 MONITORING AND REPORTING 
Description 
 Although the Reports of the Secretary General do not have a separate “gender” section, 
gender issues are integrated throughout the reports in more relevant sections.  Furthermore, 
UNMIT is the only mission to have quarterly reports of the Gender Affairs division, opening the 
books into the daily operations of the senior gender advisor.  These reports are extensive and 
demonstrate the coordination of the Gender Advisor with other segments of UNMIT and other 
UN agencies.  While the differences in reporting techniques between UNMIT and the other 
missions may seem minor, they are in fact quite significant for the mission’s perspective of itself 
and for the progress of UN missions in the future.   
The only issue with UNMIT’s reporting is a lack of better conduct and discipline 
reporting.  It is unclear how many incidents have taken place, particularly in the area of SEA.  
Without these numbers, UNMIT does lack some credibility and potentially an awareness of SEA 
problems. 
 
 91 
Evaluation 
 Despite one failure on this criterion, UNMIT had made adequate efforts towards 
mainstreaming.  The integrated reporting and detailed gender unit reports are superior to other 
methods.  The integrated reports allow other peacekeeping officials looking for methods or best 
practices in various programs to be confronted by mainstreaming tasks.  The gender unit reports 
hold that unit accountable and demonstrate the importance of such a unit in UN missions.  Thus, 
UNMIT clearly deserves the adequate marks on this criterion. 
5.7 SUMMARY 
Peacekeeping Operation     Adequate  
Post-Conflict Reconstruction     Adequate 
DDR        N/A 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Adequate 
Gender Balance      None 
Preventing and Responding to GBV    Inadequate 
 by UN personnel 
Monitoring and Reporting     Adequate 
 
UNMIT made adequate efforts on a majority of the mainstreaming criteria and is thus a 
highly exceptional case.  The country’s unique history and the UN’s program of nation-building 
had a strong influence on UNMIT’s gender mainstreaming efforts.212  Therefore, UNMIT’s 
efforts in isolation are questionable because the mission is merely building upon the success of 
UNTAET and other previous UN missions in the country.  UNTAET is unique, however, 
because the mission allowed the UN to create an entire government structure and related 
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institutions in the country.  One of the features UNTAET built into the government was a gender 
unit.  Sherrill Whittington, a member of UNTAET’s gender affairs unit, comments on the value 
of this: “national governments are being established, and the creation of a sustainable Gender Affairs 
office has the potential to become the national machinery for women.”213  Additionally, UNTAET 
ensured the new government’s conformity to international human rights standards and 
agreements like CEDAW.  Clearly, when the UN virtually controls a nation’s governance and 
policies, and the leadership is committed to mainstreaming, success is imminent. 
Another anomalous, and potentially related, characteristic of UNMIT is that it is the only 
case in this paper which effectively reported gender data.  This was certainly influenced by 
UNMIT’s ability to commit staff to this task based on the stable security situation and the 
government foundations built by previous missions.  Additionally, the increased number of 
gender advisors integrated into the mission certainly played a role in tabulating and reporting 
gender data.  Thus, successful reporting reinforces the need for a robust, fully staffed gender unit 
with supporting gender advisors in other units. 
Considering UNMIT’s success in so many of the criteria, the mission’s lack of gender 
balance is ironic.  This case demonstrates that while gender balance is sufficient for a mission to 
claim mainstreaming success, it is not a necessary condition.  This seems counterintuitive given 
the beneficial role that gender balance can have in planning in criteria such as post-conflict 
reconstruction, DDR, and preventing and responding to gender based violence.  In UNMIT, 
other factors, both in UNMIT and prior missions, have clearly assumed the roles that increases in 
the presence of women play in other missions.  Supportive leadership and multiple gender 
advisors are some of the possible factors. 
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Finally, the two areas in which UNMIT did not make adequate efforts are both criteria in 
which the other missions examined in this paper struggled with, as well.  The following chapter 
will comment on these system-wide peacekeeping issues. 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS 
In the summaries of the previous four chapters, nation-building, poverty, and basic peace 
and security have all affected the ability of peacekeeping missions to mainstream effectively.  
While the results of these unique situations have been addressed in prior sections, there are also 
trends across several of the case studies that have not been addressed.  Most significantly, there 
are three criteria in which three or more of the missions had inadequate or no efforts: gender 
balance, gender-based violence by UN personnel, and monitoring and reporting.  Upon closer 
examination, these poor scores appear to be the result of more than just failures of individual 
missions; there are broader policies of the DPKO and the UN which have caused these failures. 
 
Gender Balance 
None of the four cases in this paper have adequately achieved gender balance, and most 
do not maintain their own statistics on gender balance.  As mentioned before, the DPKO began 
substituting for some of this data collection in August of 2006.  Appendix E reflects the gender 
balance of military personnel in all UN peacekeeping missions, as recorded by the DPKO.  The 
percent of women hangs at approximately two percent, with rises and dips, but no consistent 
pattern of improvement over the last two and a half years.  Furthermore, even after crediting the 
DPKO for maintaining these statistics, consistent data on civilian police and civilian personnel is 
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still lacking.  Neither individual missions nor the DPKO have been able to maintain these 
records. 
Beyond the lack of data, the existing data indicate a problem in that there is no parity in 
any division of UN personnel.  The main reason for this problem is that gender balance is 
influenced by the voluntary contributions of member nations.  Member nations set their own 
eligibility policies for their national armies which frequently exclude women from some or all 
areas of service.  Thus, many troop-contributing nations simply do not have military women to 
provide to peacekeeping missions.  In response to the lack of gender balance, the DPKO began 
efforts to promote the recruitment of women.  The Secretary General’s 2004 Women, Peace and 
Security report discusses the challenge of recruiting qualified women.214  The report also 
indicates one effort in which the DPKO “introduced specific language into vacancy 
announcements, targeting professional women’s organizations”215  However, subsequent reports 
on Women, Peace, and Security rarely mention gender balance or only discuss the issue in terms 
of women’s representation in leadership positions.  This demonstrates the need to consistently 
relay the problem of a widespread lack of women in military, police, and civilian components of 
peacekeeping missions. 
Other efforts to promote gender balance have included workshops and reports on the 
issue.  In March of 2006, the UN held a policy dialogue to review strategies for enhancing 
gender balance among uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions.  The dialogue developed 
recommendations for both member nations and the DPKO.  For example, the DPKO was 
instructed to specify a minimum number or percent of women required for deployment, and 
member nations were asked to maintain a list of women with relevant peacekeeping skills for 
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short-term deployment and to work with the DPKO to revise their recruitment practices.216  A 
2007 Strategy Workshop on the Implementation of Resolution 1325 made similar 
recommendations for member nations to develop national policies on the deployment of women 
in peacekeeping operations and to integrate gender into defense departments or military 
leadership positions.  The workshop recommended removing policies like biometric 
requirements (physical and strength tests) that discriminate against women’s participation in 
military units, and increasing public information campaigns promoting women in 
peacekeeping.217 
Unfortunately the most that any workshop, strategy session, or request of the Secretary 
General can do is recommend, advise, or request.  Thus, the United Nations should consider a 
policy of positive incentives for member nations that achieve set benchmarks toward full 
equality of men and women in military, police, and civilian contributions.  Incentives could be 
either monetary (compensation for female units would be higher) or political (that country’s 
nationals are favored in appointments).  Such policies would have positive effects in achieving 
gender balance in UN peacekeeping, but would also promote progressive policies in nations 
which currently exclude women in national militaries or police forces. 
 
Sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence by UN personnel 
 Closely related to the gender balance problem is the issue of gender-based violence by 
UN peacekeepers.  This relation is described by Sarah Martin in a 2005 report of Refugees 
International as: “since the bulk of personnel in peacekeeping missions are men, a hyper-
masculine culture that encourages sexual exploitation and abuse and a tradition of silence have 
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evolved within them.”218  Although the 2008 Women, Peace, and Security Report observes an 
overall decline in instances of SEA by UN personnel (“from 371 reported in 2006 to 159 cases 
reported in 2007”219), this is 159 more incidents than a zero-tolerance policy should allow for. 
 As described in the four cases above, the only UN policy that is consistent in all cases is 
training and “enforcement” of the zero-tolerance policy.  Some personnel may receive some of 
the information during pre-deployment training by their home country or from regional 
peacekeeping institutes.  Theoretically, all personnel receive this training during induction in 
their mission country.  However, simply providing conduct and discipline information once is 
clearly not enough to prevent these crimes from occurring:  
While this training covers the issues of sexual exploitation and the UN’s approach 
to gender, it’s unclear whether or not it is effective. This training covers 
everything from the codes of conduct to human resources issues. According to one 
UNMIL employee, “It’s too intensive. You get bombarded with information and it 
happens right after you’ve been traveling. It’s hard to remember anything that 
came out of it.220 
 
In addition to the poor timing and overwhelming nature of induction training, other barriers may 
prevent the absorption of information as well.  For example, as was described specifically in 
MONUC’s training programs, it is common that military and police personnel do not all speak 
the mission language.  Thus, training information is lost or commanders ineffectively translate 
information, resulting in misunderstandings of gender and conduct information. 
Another issue may be differences in cultures.  Martin explains, “each contributing 
country has its own culture and mores, its own attitudes toward alcohol, women, sex and its own 
thoughts about what constitutes ‘proper behavior.’”221  She goes on to provide an example of 
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Pakistani soldiers who were shocked by Sierra Leonean women who worked bare-breasted.  
These cultural differences require sensitivity training along with the understanding that GBV and 
SEA are unacceptable despite cultural differences in sex and gender. 
A final significant aspect of the problem is the inability of the UN and local victims to 
follow-up with disciplinary measures.  Peacekeeping troops report to their home country 
commanders and these countries retain control over conduct and discipline issues.  Thus, 
observes Martin, “if a soldier is found guilty, that person is sent back to his country for 
discipline. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for victims and their families to determine what, 
if any, actions have been taken.”222  Until recently, the UN merely repatriated soldiers found 
guilty of SEA or other conduct issues and forwarded the investigation report to their home 
nation.  There is now a greater move to follow-up with disciplinary actions.  However, member 
nations have an ambiguous legal obligation to take action against their own citizens’ criminal 
acts.  Thus, especially as fellow soldiers see that few if any consequences exist for these acts, a 
culture of impunity is established. 
Because it is clear that there are shortfalls in many of the current efforts to prevent SEA 
issues, likely no one solution will be enough.  However, in addition to increasing gender balance 
(as described above), the next step needs to change the current training program.  Member 
nations must take greater responsibility for training their troops in international human rights 
norms.  Developing military and police units that are professionals in international peacekeeping 
would be an ideal solution.  The current deployment of units for only a few months promotes a 
temporary view of peacekeeping missions in which peacekeepers’ actions do not have 
consequences.  Instead, developing professionals who receive training on SEA (and other gender 
                                                 
222 18-iv 
 99 
sensitivity, human rights, and best practices) over a period of months and years will help 
peacekeepers to become vested in missions. 
Unfortunately, this solution is not realistic for the all personnel in peacekeeping missions 
(or would take decades to implement if it was to become practical).  Thus, in the short term, the 
UN must work on deterrence and demonstrating the clear consequences of SEA to its personnel.  
When troops are repatriated for punishment, individual missions need to follow-up with the 
disciplinary action taken and relay that information back to the rest of the force.  Furthermore, 
follow-up trainings for all mission personnel need to emphasize both disciplinary consequences 
to the individual and security and perception consequences for the mission. 
  
Monitoring and Reporting 
The third and final system-wide failure of the DPKO in mainstreaming is a lack of 
monitoring and reporting.  The 2004 Women Peace and Security Report indicated that in the first 
six months of 2004, 23.5% of UN reports contained multiple references to gender.223  A main 
reason for the lack of gender reporting, and the lack of detailed programmatic reporting, is 
limited staff and limited time.  However, statistical information – such as gender disaggregated 
data on DDR participants, gender balance, or incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse – should 
not require an overwhelming number of resources.  In these situations, the Security Council 
should set and enforce a standard for gender reporting.  A suggestion from the Windhoek 
Declaration to avoid the resource trade-off was to have an external end of mission report that 
includes a gender perspective.224  In addition to ongoing gender reporting, this could be a 
valuable asset to UN mainstreaming operations.  While the missions examined in this paper are 
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all still in operation, this recommendation could promote the missions’ successes and apply them 
to future operations. 
A different sort of recommendation to address reporting is to have the current external 
agency in charge of monitoring and reporting, the DPKO Best Practices Section, change its style 
of reporting.  The Section’s current reports are long, their subjects are ad hoc, and the topics may 
or may not include gender.  However, this section has the resources to write much shorter reports 
on individual successful programs in one mission.  Such reports, indexed by mission area or 
program type, would truly share accomplishments among missions and allow for mission leaders 
to easily access information about mainstreaming in particular areas. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the UN must improve its record on these three criteria in all peacekeeping 
missions.  Additionally, the issues of poverty, basic peace and security, and nation-building as 
described in previous summaries, must be taken into consideration as well.  While these are 
significant challenges, the UN has the ability to take action and improve as it has been improving 
over the past few decades.  While there is no silver bullet, many small reforms in the past have 
been successful and the recommendations of this paper may continue to create progress 
throughout the DPKO and for all people in post-conflict nations. 
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYM INDEX 
AIDS – Acquired Immunodeficiency Disorder Syndrome 
CDC – Community Development Committee (Haiti) 
CAFF – Children Associated with Fighting Forces 
CARICOM – Caribbean Community 
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
CIVPOL – Civilian Police (of the United Nations) 
CVPD – Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (Haiti) 
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
DDRR – Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation 
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECOWAS – Economic Coalition of West African States 
FARDC – Congolese National Army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) 
FGM – Female Genital Mutilation 
GBV – Gender-Based Violence 
HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HNP – Haitian National Police 
LNP – Liberian National Police 
MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la 
Stabilisation en Haïti) 
MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
NEC – National Electoral Commission (Liberia) 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
OAS – Organization of American States 
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OGA – Office of Gender Affairs 
PKO – Peacekeeping Operation 
PNC – Congolese National Police 
PNTL – National Police of Timor-Leste (Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste) 
QIP – Quick Impact Project 
ROC – Reinsertion Orientation Centers (Haiti) 
SEA – Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General 
UN – United Nations 
UNDP – United Nations Development Program 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women 
UNITAR – United Nations Instituted for Training and Research 
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNMIT – United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste 
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
VPU – Vulnerable Persons Unit (Timor-Leste) 
WAFF – Women Associated with Fighting Forces 
WHO – World Health Organization 
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APPENDIX B: UNMIL GENDER BALANCE 
B.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN 
 
 
 
 Total 
# 
women 
% 
women 
Jan. 2009 10762 254 2.36%
Dec. 2008 10787 256 2.37%
Nov. 2008 10982 258 2.35%
Oct. 2008 11646 258 2.22%
Sept. 2008 11645 259 2.22%
Aug. 2008 11642 262 2.25%
Jul. 2008 11729 240 2.05%
Jun. 2008 11788 236 2.00%
May. 2008 11789 236 2.00%
Apr. 2008 12235 236 1.93%
Mar. 2008 12438 235 1.89%
Feb. 2008 12948 224 1.73%
Jan. 2008 13485 213 1.58%
Dec. 2007 13509 208 1.54%
Nov. 2007 13534 207 1.53%
Oct. 2007 13528 206 1.52%
Sept. 2007 14125 286 2.02%
Aug. 2007 14127 290 2.05%
Jul. 2007 14135 263 1.86%
Jun. 2007 14151 273 1.93%
May. 2007 14138 270 1.91%
Apr. 2007 14060 294 2.09%
Mar. 2007 14055 314 2.23%
Feb. 2007 14056 318 2.26%
Jan. 2007 14003 318 2.27%
Dec. 2006 13801 150 1.09%
Nov. 2006 14541 330 2.27%
Oct. 2006 14641 337 2.30%
Sept. 2006 14770 344 2.33%
Aug. 2006 14807 345 2.33%
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B.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN 
UNMIL military personnel
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APPENDIX C: MONUC GENDER BALANCE 
C.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN 
 Total 
# 
women 
% 
women 
Jan. 2009 17319 268 1.55%
Dec. 2008 17343 268 1.55%
Nov. 2008 17305 268 1.55%
Oct. 2008 17425 270 1.55%
Sept. 2008 17342 228 1.31%
Aug. 2008 17338 229 1.32%
Jul. 2008 17346 233 1.34%
Jun. 2008 17359 295 1.70%
May. 2008 17365 300 1.73%
Apr. 2008 17383 300 1.73%
Mar. 2008 17359 321 1.85%
Feb. 2008 17355 323 1.86%
Jan. 2008 17349 326 1.88%
Dec. 2007 17347 333 1.92%
Nov. 2007 17396 377 2.17%
Oct. 2007 17388 376 2.16%
Sept. 2007 17361 374 2.15%
Aug. 2007 17284 362 2.09%
Jul. 2007 17363 309 1.78%
Jun. 2007 17348 309 1.78%
May. 2007 17321 308 1.78%
Apr. 2007 17318 301 1.74%
Mar. 2007 17307 301 1.74%
Feb. 2007 17342 301 1.74%
Jan. 2007 17332 304 1.75%
Dec. 2006 17221 216 1.25%
Nov. 2006 17398 305 1.75%
Oct. 2006 17397 336 1.93%
Sept. 2006 17390 337 1.94%
Aug. 2006 17415 342 1.96%
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 C.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN 
MONUC military personnel
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APPENDIX D: MINUSTAH GENDER BALANCE 
D.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN 
 Total
# 
women 
% 
women 
Jan. 2009 7037 124 1.76%
Dec. 2008 7036 127 1.81%
Nov. 2008 7013 126 1.80%
Oct. 2008 7009 120 1.71%
Sept. 2008 7018 120 1.71%
Aug. 2008 7027 122 1.74%
Jul. 2008 7105 124 1.75%
Jun. 2008 7070 125 1.77%
May. 2008 7174 125 1.74%
Apr. 2008 7082 125 1.77%
Mar. 2008 7064 124 1.76%
Feb. 2008 7060 130 1.84%
Jan. 2008 7066 132 1.87
Dec. 2007 7047 126 1.79%
Nov. 2007 7062 134 1.90%
Oct. 2007 7060 125 1.77%
Sept. 2007 7062 125 1.77%
Aug. 2007 7054 129 1.83%
Jul. 2007 7081 134 1.89%
Jun. 2007 7065 125 1.77%
May. 2007 7050 120 1.70%
Apr. 2007 7036 117 1.66%
Mar. 2007 7023 116 1.65%
Feb. 2007 6799 110 1.62%
Jan. 2007 6782 104 1.53%
Dec. 2006 6684 96 1.44%
Nov. 2006 6668 95 1.42%
Oct. 2006 6652 94 1.41%
Sept. 2006 6642 92 1.39%
Aug. 2006 6430 87 1.35%
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D.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN 
MINUSTAH
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APPENDIX E: UNMIT GENDER BALANCE 
E.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN 
UNMIT    
 Total 
# 
women 
% 
women 
Jan. 2009 33 2 6.06%
Dec. 2008 33 1 3.03%
Nov. 2008 32 1 3.13%
Oct. 2008 32 0 0%
Sept. 2008 33 0 0%
Aug. 2008 33 0 0%
Jul. 2008 33 0 0%
Jun. 2008 31 0 0%
May. 2008 31 0 0%
Apr. 2008 31 0 0%
Mar. 2008 33 0 0%
Feb. 2008 32 0 0%
Jan. 2008 32 0 0%
Dec. 2007 33 0 0%
Nov. 2007 33 0 0%
Oct. 2007 32 1 3.13%
Sept. 2007 37 1 2.70%
Aug. 2007 32 1 3.13%
Jul. 2007 33 1 3.03%
Jun. 2007 33 1 3.03%
May. 2007 33 2 6.06%
Apr. 2007 33 1 3.03%
Mar. 2007 33 1 3.03%
Feb. 2007 33 1 3.03%
Jan. 2007 32 1 3.13%
Dec. 2006 32 1 3.13%
Nov. 2006 32 1 3.13%
Oct. 2006 31 1 3.23%
Sept. 2006 18 1 5.56%
Aug. 2006 15 1 6.67%
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E.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN 
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APPENDIX F: ALL UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS GENDER BALANCE 
F.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN 
All 
Missions    
 Total 
# 
women 
% 
women 
Jan. 2009 80597 1743 2.16%
Dec. 2008 80201 1794 2.24%
Nov. 2008 78170 1789 2.29%
Oct. 2008 78124 1789 2.29%
Sept. 2008 77231 1626 2.11%
Aug. 2008 77057 1734 2.25%
Jul. 2008 77117 1640 2.13%
Jun. 2008 76934 1671 2.17%
May. 2008 77050 1651 2.14%
Apr. 2008 77388 1651 2.13%
Mar. 2008 77492 1539 1.99%
Feb. 2008 79269 1534 1.94%
Jan. 2008 79629 1476 1.85%
Dec. 2007 73232 1360 1.86%
Nov. 2007 73348 1408 1.92%
Oct. 2007 73287 1406 1.92%
Sept. 2007 73908 1476 2.00%
Aug. 2007 73948 1486 2.00%
Jul. 2007 74181 1411 1.90%
Jun. 2007 73918 1411 1.91%
May. 2007 73771 1414 1.92%
Apr. 2007 73706 1417 1.92%
Mar. 2007 73475 1416 1.93%
Feb. 2007 73307 1305 1.78%
Jan. 2007 72784 1299 1.78%
Dec. 2006 71673 1034 1.44%
Nov. 2006 73638 1199 1.63%
Oct. 2006 72488 1234 1.70%
Sept. 2006 69055 1235 1.79%
Aug. 2006 66790 1235 1.85%
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